

Current History

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Foreign Policy in the U.S.S.R.

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Current History

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The editors open the year with a reappraisal of Soviet foreign policy and its portent for a troubled world. In seven articles Soviet foreign policy both inside and outside the Communist bloc is surveyed and evaluated. In the following review of Soviet policy in West Europe, this author concludes that "it seems probable that Moscow will continue to undermine, by all means at its disposal, the precarious unity of the West."

The U.S.S.R. and West Europe

BY MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY

Professor of Economics, Columbia University

THE hopes for a radical improvement in the East-West relations raised by the death of Stalin have worn exceedingly thin by 1959. Western belief that the era of peaceful coexistence was just around the corner stemmed largely from the acceptance of the notion of collective leadership which was supposed to have superseded Stalin's one-man rule. The execution of Beria and the demotion and political eclipse of Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Shepilov, Zhukov and Khrushchev's erstwhile inseparable travelling companion Bulganin give the measure of the influence and degree of personal security enjoyed by even the top members of the Soviet hierarchy. Commenting on the appointment of Khrushchev as president of the council of ministers, a London journal remarked that this was a case of a collective leader, not collective leadership.

It is an uncomfortable yet inescapable fact that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is governed by the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. The inevitable destruction of the capitalist society which is allegedly doomed by historical forces is a basic premise of this theory. Under Khrushchev, as under Bulganin and Malenkov and, before them, under Stalin, the chief object of Soviet foreign policy is the elimination of the capitalist environment. As stated in an article which appeared in these columns two years ago (February, 1957) "the princi-

pal components of this policy which is carried on under the banner of the struggle for peace are the systematic weakening of the position of the Western powers in the colonial and under-developed countries, the undermining of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) and other anti-Communist alliances, and the prevention of the unification of Germany on terms acceptable to the West." Other significant elements in Soviet foreign policy were disarmament, limitation or prohibition of the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons, control over the "captive nations," and promotion of trade, cultural exchanges, and personal contacts between the leaders of the two camps.

Soviet foreign relations display notable continuity and the list of objectives drawn two years ago still holds good. To this roster may be added Moscow's eagerness for a summit conference. The idea of a conference of the heads of states is not novel, but the meeting "at the summit" in July, 1955, proved disappointing and barren of practical results, and the issue was largely dropped in the later part of 1956 when public attention was centered on the Suez crisis and events in Poland and Hungary. It was revived late in 1957 and remained in the limelight until the outbreak of the Quemoy crisis in August, 1958.

Two novel departures may be noted in Soviet diplomatic methods: the number and the length of the communications emanating

from the Moscow Foreign Office have increased prodigiously and their tone has undergone a marked change. The softening of Soviet official phraseology of which Harold Macmillan spoke approvingly at the United Nations in September, 1955, was no longer observable during the Suez and Hungarian crises, and by the autumn of 1958 the intemperance of Soviet language assumed so offensive a form that a note from Khrushchev to Eisenhower was returned as unacceptable. The Western European countries were meted out a like treatment.

A discussion of Soviet policy towards Western Europe presents particular difficulties. England, France and other European nations are world powers with extensive international political and economic ties. Nato, although ostensibly an alliance for the defense of Europe, leans heavily on the military might of the United States and Canada. The foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. and its satellites is essentially global. Developments in North Africa, in the Arab oil lands, in the straits of Formosa and in Hong Kong are bound to have immediate and important repercussions in Western Europe. It is practically impossible to segregate Soviet policy in that part of the world.

England, France, and Germany

During the last two years Soviet relations with the leading Western European powers—England and France—were dominated by the heavy heritage of hostility left behind by the Suez débâcle and the Hungarian revolt. Repeated attempts to relieve the tension were frustrated by new untoward incidents and sharp conflicts of policy in Europe and in the East.

Early in 1957 Harold Macmillan, the British prime minister, was invited to visit Moscow in May or at any other time that might have been arranged. In replying to a message from Bulganin of April 20, Macmillan, in a very long note of June 16, 1957, welcomed the "conciliatory tone" of the Russian communication but voiced his disappointment "at the lack of any new and constructive proposals." He stated that much "can and should be done" to improve the relations between the two countries but added that "it would be disingenuous . . . not to repeat that great problems still divide

us. There is the question of Europe where our views are very dissimilar both about Germany and about Hungary. There is the Middle East, in which we have yet to find common ground. We have a different point of view on many great issues, indeed on the most fundamental basis of life." The prime minister felt, nevertheless, that "these differences ought not prevent us from making some kind of advance towards a more sensible relationship between our two countries."

Returning to this theme six months later, Macmillan said in a broadcast (January 5, 1958) that "nobody could have tried harder than we to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union . . . we could not get an agreement. But I don't despair. . . ." The crux of the matter is that on every issue which affects vitally British interests the Soviets invariably lend their support to her antagonists. The Kremlin stands firmly by Nasser and has embarked in the Middle East on a comprehensive program of aid designed to eliminate the influence of the Western nations and particularly inimical to British and American oil interests.

Moscow has opposed, in Athens and in the United Nations, British efforts to find a constitutional solution for the Cyprus imbroglio. The Muscovites have denounced the intervention of the United States and Great Britain in Lebanon and Jordan, a move brought about by the revolution and massacres in Iraq which the Russians had helped to engineer. There were inspired rumors of the imminent arrival in the Middle East of Russian "volunteers" while Russian troops held much publicized maneuvers in the region of the Caucasus. Way north, the Kremlin welcomed the decision of the Icelandic government to extend the limits of its territorial waters from four to twelve miles; this revision of policy infringed upon the traditional fishing rights enjoyed by the powers using these waters and precipitated a conflict between Iceland and her Nato partners, especially England (August-September, 1958).

Soviet relations with France followed a similar pattern. On May 20, 1957, Bulganin sent to Guy Mollet, then French prime minister, a lengthy message pleading for "the development and improvement of French-Soviet relations." The note recalled

the "friendly contacts between the two countries" which were strengthened by "the frequent common struggle of the Russian and French peoples against the common enemy," and stressed the danger of revival of German militarism, a statement that could not fail to strike a responsive chord in Paris. Mollet, leader of the French Socialist Party, was reminded of the words of Jaurès, "the ardent patriot and most prominent socialist in France," that a Russian revolution would lead to "a real Franco-Russian alliance which will become a mighty factor for peace in Europe." The Soviet message, however, made no concession to the Western point of view and merely reiterated the familiar and avowedly unacceptable Russian program which provided for the dismantling of Nato, the unification of Germany on Soviet terms (which will be discussed later), and the drastic revision of French policy in North Africa and the Middle East.

A Soviet note of March 3, 1958, which dealt primarily with the proposed summit conference, suggested the establishment in Moscow and Paris of chambers of commerce that would minister to the expansion of the Franco-Soviet trade and "organize industrial and agricultural exhibitions" in the two countries. The same note, however, took France to task for the punitive bombing of the Tunisian village of Sakiët-Sidi-Youssef. In an interview March 27, 1958, with S. Groussard, a correspondent of *Le Figaro*, Khrushchev characterized the Algerian war as "a colonial war to strengthen the chains of colonial slavery" and prophesied that France would be defeated. In the joint Soviet-Egyptian statement (May 15, 1958) issued at the conclusion of Nasser's visit to Moscow the two governments condemned "the barbarous war that France is waging against the Algerian people. . . ."

The immediate Soviet reaction to the advent of de Gaulle was less violent than might have been expected although Moscow continued to support the French Communist party which strongly opposed the new government. The real attitude of the Kremlin was made clear in an interview given by Khrushchev to *Pravda* on September 21, a week before the French plebiscite. According to Khrushchev, French developments "revive the memories of the events in Germany in

1933. It can be said with full justification that the danger of fascism has arisen in France." This carefully-timed pronouncement had no desired effect on the outcome of the voting, but the Kremlin was not chastened. It was no accident that Moscow was the first capital to grant recognition—and, reportedly, to offer economic and technical assistance—to French Guinea which in the September plebiscite rejected the draft constitution and became an independent state.

Soviet relations with West Germany unfolded along different lines. The cardinal points at issue between Moscow and Bonn are the unification of Germany and the rearmament of the Federal Republic in the framework of Nato. According to a Soviet-East German communiqué (January 7, 1957) "the main obstacle to the reunification of Germany . . . is the present political line of the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, its policy of remilitarization, participation in the aggressive military Nato bloc and suppression of democratic rights and freedoms in West Germany." Chancellor Adenauer and his government have consistently maintained that there is only one Germany—the Federal Republic—and that unification should be achieved "by means of free elections," as provided by a directive of the Geneva summit conference of 1955. The Western European powers and the United States take the same view.

The Kremlin has held just as consistently that unification could be attained only by direct negotiations between East and West Germany. Speaking in Berlin on August 8, 1957, Khrushchev declared that the unified Germany of the future will be a confederation of the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic and that all foreign troops will be withdrawn from the German soil.

A year later (July, 1958) Khrushchev rejected as unacceptable and a fraud the West German proposal for the creation of a permanent "committee of four" (France, Great Britain, the United States, and the U.S.S.R.) to frame proposals for the solution of the German question.

No opportunity is missed to remind the Germans of the "historical sins" of their Nato partners. At a dinner in his honor in Bonn (April 25, 1958), Mikoyan recalled

that the Soviet Union "has resolutely opposed the Versailles Treaty and has supported Germany in her struggle to free herself from its yoke," and *Pravda* noted (May 13, 1958) that "the plans for the dismemberment of Germany were matured before the war in the very department now headed by Dulles."

The decision of the *Bundestag* (March 25, 1958) to equip the West German armed forces with atomic weapons and missiles moved the Supreme Soviet to send a solemn protest to the parliament of the Federal Republic and to the governments of the states formerly members of the anti-Hitler coalition. "The atomic arming of West Germany," said Khrushchev in May 1958, "shuts tightly the only remaining door to the restoration of German national unity." On the basic issues of unification and rearmament (which also means membership in Nato) Bonn and Moscow are poles apart.

There is, however, a brighter side to the picture. Soviet-West German negotiations for a trade agreement which were initiated in 1957 were brought to a successful conclusion in April, 1958. The agreement covers a period of three years, provides for a substantial increase in trade, and endeavors to settle some of the vexing questions of the repatriation of Germans still in the U.S.S.R.

A *detente* in East-West relations is suggested by the reported increase in tourist travel; it was officially stated that in 1956, 561,000 Soviet citizens went abroad, and in 1957, 716,000, which are surprisingly high figures. How many of the tourists visited Western Europe was not disclosed. There was considerable acceleration in the tempo of cultural exchanges. The Soviet pavilion at the Brussels Fair attracted much attention as did the Russian artists, orchestras and theatrical and ballet companies appearing in Brussels, Paris, London and elsewhere. Their Western counterparts went to the Soviet Union where they were warmly received.

The beneficial effects of these friendly gestures were marred by the announcement of the execution of the Hungarian Communist leader Imre Nagy and his associates (June 17, 1958) which provoked a violent hostile reaction in the West and led to anti-Soviet demonstrations in Copenhagen, Bonn

and New York. Counter-demonstrations directed against the countries concerned were staged in Moscow. The governments protested and there was much bitterness and mutual recrimination.

Disarmament

Disarmament loomed large in recent Soviet dealings with the West. Although the United States and in a smaller degree Canada are still the arsenal of democracy, Great Britain, France, West Germany and the other members of Nato have a vital part in the organization of European defense. It is the weakening of Nato rather than the advancement of disarmament as such that is the real object of Soviet "peace" policy in Europe. In pursuance of this aim the Kremlin has shown imagination and perseverance, and the foreign offices and military establishments of the Western powers were all but submerged by waves of Soviet plans, memoranda, aide-memoires, proposals, and counter-proposals which followed one another at the rate of sometimes several a week. Thus far the practical results of these feverish activities are exceedingly meager; only the more important moves can be recorded here.

The opening gun of the new "peace" campaign was a statement by *Tass* and an article in *Pravda* which both appeared on January 23, 1957. Commenting on newspaper reports that United States army bases supplied with atomic weapons were to be established in foreign lands, *Tass* argued that the object of this arrangement was "to divert the main retaliatory action away from the United States" and "to place first the peoples of Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Turkey, Iran, Japan, and other countries . . . under the jeopardy of retaliatory atomic action." The "leading circles" of the Soviet Union were convinced that the peoples of the countries concerned "will resolutely resist" the implementation of the American plan.

The aims of Soviet policy, as summarized in a letter from Bulganin to President Eisenhower of February 3, 1958, were the discontinuation of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests; renunciation by the U.S.S.R., the United States and Great Britain of the use of nuclear weapons; a non-aggression treaty between the members of Nato and the mem-

bers of the Warsaw Pact (which was concluded in May, 1955, as the Communist counterpart of Nato); reduction of the foreign troops on the territory of Germany and other European states; agreement on questions connected with the prevention of surprise attacks; extension of foreign trade; and easing of tension in the Middle East. These topics were to be discussed at a meeting of the heads of states. A statement of the Soviet foreign ministry of March 15, 1958, added to the above program the ban on the use of cosmic space for military purposes; the elimination of foreign military bases on the territories of other states; the supervision of the fulfillment of the above obligations by an international agency within the framework of the United Nations; and the creation of an international agency for the coordination of studies of outer space.

It proved impossible to implement this program, the Soviet Union and the Western powers being unable to agree on concrete policies. The so-called Rapacki Plan for the creation of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, which was first presented by the Polish Government to the General Assembly of the United Nations in October 1957, was redrafted and submitted in February, 1958, to the diplomatic representatives accredited to Warsaw.

Named after the Polish foreign minister and fully endorsed by the Soviet Union, the plan provided for a denuclearized zone that would include Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East and West Germany. Nuclear weapons would be excluded from this territory and the use of such weapons against the zone would be prohibited. The enforcement of these rules was to be guaranteed by France, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, and there was to be a broad system of international control. The Western powers found themselves unable to accept this proposal which undermined the very foundation of Nato.

On March 31, 1958, the Soviet Union dramatically announced the unilateral suspension of thermonuclear bomb tests, provided, however, that similar steps would be taken by the United States and Great Britain. This initiative, again, did not meet with immediate response on the part of the West.

At the end of September the U.S.S.R. resumed the thermonuclear bomb tests on the ground that the United States and Great Britain had used the time since March 31 to gain "maximum and unilateral military advantage." Gromyko made it clear in the United Nations that the Soviet Union would stop its tests only under an agreement with the United States and Great Britain for a permanent and unconditional ban on thermonuclear bomb test explosions. The Soviet action presumably freed the United States from the self-imposed obligation to discontinue nuclear tests for one year after October 31, 1958. As these lines go to press it is not certain whether the conference on nuclear test suspension which was to meet in Geneva on October 31 will be held. Its chances of reaching an acceptable agreement are not bright.

Meanwhile the Kremlin directed a barrage of diplomatic notes at the Nato members warning them that the establishment within their territories of bases equipped with atomic or hydrogen weapons would have dire consequences. These states, however, including the smaller ones in exposed geographical locations—Norway, Turkey, Greece—would not be intimidated and remained faithful to the alliance.

The recent measures for European integration, especially the Rome treaties establishing the Common Market and Euratom, were denounced by the Kremlin as "a menace to the people of Europe." The new international institutions provided by these treaties were represented as tools of German *revanchists* and American "monopolies" which had allegedly invaded the European markets (Statement of March 16, 1957). Such interpretations disclose an astonishing ignorance of Europe and are but flights of fancy.

A Summit Conference?

The convocation of a conference "at the summit" has been much discussed since the end of 1957, the Soviets relentlessly pressing for such a meeting while Western leaders showed less eagerness and, in some cases, a distinct reluctance to face the Muscovites. Khrushchev complained, on good ground, that arrangements for the conference were progressing at "snail's pace" (May 24, 1958).

The crisis in the Middle East which the Communists presumably helped to bring about provided the opportunity for which Khrushchev was waiting. On July 19 he issued an urgent invitation calling for the meeting of a summit conference at Geneva on July 22. "The important thing is that there be no delay . . .," he wrote, "for cannons are already beginning to roar." This dramatic appeal was given a mixed reception; the sense of urgency was lost in a maze of wrangling about procedure and the conference never met, but a world war did not break out, a measure of political stability was restored in the Middle East, and the withdrawal of American and British troops from Lebanon and Jordan was arranged under the auspices of the United Nations.

Would a summit conference serve a useful purpose? The questions which the Soviet Union wants to be discussed are those bearing on disarmament and what is called in Moscow "relaxation of international tension." Is there any reason to believe that issues such as the renunciation of atomic weapons or the elimination of foreign military bases would be tackled more successfully by heads of governments than by foreign ministers or ambassadors?

Khrushchev has made it clear that the unification of Germany and the fate of European countries behind the iron curtain could not be discussed. The *mot d'ordre* of Soviet diplomacy in 1958 would seem to be

that it serves no useful purpose to talk about issues on which no agreement is possible. If this principle is accepted, the reasons for calling a conference of heads of states would seem to be slight. Referring to Khrushchev's "special outrageousness," *The Economist* wrote (July 26, 1958) that "it is easy to picture the sort of summit meeting that presents itself to his mind's eye—something like the Mecklenburger's idea of heaven, where the righteous sit in front and eat, and eat, and eat, but the ungodly seat in the back and digest, and digest, and digest." Is it surprising that Eisenhower, Macmillan, and de Gaulle hesitated to take the road to Geneva?

The Outlook

Crystal gazing is an unrewarding occupation, but the above discussion may justify some guarded and tentative conclusions. The main objective of Soviet foreign policy—the elimination of capitalist environment—is not subject to change. It is most unlikely that the Kremlin would make any concession on the question of German unification or would relax its control over the countries of Eastern Europe. It seems probable that Moscow will continue to undermine, by all means at its disposal, the precarious unity of the West.

Nato is likely to be the principal target of Soviet attacks, but what form they will take it is impossible to say. In June, 1956, the Soviet Foreign Minister and Nasser reached an agreement in Cairo on how "to ease international tension and strengthen general peace." A month later Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. At the end of August, 1958, Khrushchev went to Peking presumably on a similar peace mission. Three weeks later the Communist Chinese began the bombing of Quemoy. The Suez and the Quemoy crises, irrespective of their grave local consequences, have both done untold harm to the unity of the West and thus weakened the position of Western Europe. The Kremlin is aware of the success of its maneuvers, which are likely to continue although no outsider can tell when and where. The West must be prepared to meet these challenges and not allow irritation, however legitimate, to interfere with that unity of purpose and action on which its survival may well depend.

Michael T. Florinsky is the author of many books including *Towards an Understanding of the U.S.S.R.* (1951); a two-volume study of *Russia: A History and an Interpretation* (1953); and *Integrated Europe?* (1955). Former editor of *Commercial and Tariff History*, 1939-1941, he is a member of the American Economic Association and the Economic History Association, among others. From 1921 to 1932, Mr. Florinsky served as associate editor of the *Economic and Social History of the World War*, a publication of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

According to this authority, today Soviet control of East Central Europe has increased in "energy and power to stop further disintegration," and to reaffirm Moscow's grip. He prophesies that "There does not seem to be anything in the current evolution of the world which would suggest an early 'agonizing reappraisal' by the Kremlin with regard to its posture in Eastern Europe."

Soviet Imperialism in East Europe

By IVO D. DUCHACEK

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ONLY if the Western boundaries of the Soviet Union were on the English Channel could one imagine a more advantageous line than the present one which Moscow now holds after having absorbed Eastern Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania into the Communist orbit. The present frontier of Soviet military might cuts across the traditional route of Western invasions into Russia—the North European plain—at a point where it is shortest, that is between Luebeck and the mountainous ridges of northwestern Czechoslovakia.

In spite of the current Soviet concentration on intercontinental missiles and atomic warheads it is still of major importance to the leaders of the huge Soviet land forces whether they can or cannot exercise a direct control over Hungary, the natural base for

pressures against Danubian and Balkanic Europe; the Mediterranean submarine and air bases along the Albanian coast; and the natural fortress of Bohemia about which Bismarck once remarked that its possession is a prerequisite for the control of Europe.

The Berlin-Tirana line, known as the Iron Curtain, cuts Europe and Germany in half and thus gives a marked advantage to the Soviet Union for both defensive and offensive actions against the West; this truly formidable advance of the Russian military line to the very heart of Europe, executed between 1944 and 1948, would justify the free world's worries as to the ultimate objectives of the Russian leaders even if they were not at the same time supreme leaders of world communism and thus fanatically committed, as Nikita Khrushchev bluntly declared in 1958, to our burial.

As seen from Moscow's point of view, in East Central Europe the "inevitability of a triumphant march of Communism . . ." was confirmed even earlier than in China. Between 1945 and 1948 the October Revolution of 1917 was exported from its home base all over East Central Europe through the instrumentality of the Red Army which was the first to move into a vacuum created by withdrawing Nazi armies. Native Communist leaders, who were in exile in Moscow during the Second World War, emerged then from Moscow's Hotel Metropole and other war-time headquarters of mid-European communism and keeping yet a safe distance, quickly followed the Soviet tanks advancing into Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and the rest of East Central Europe.

The Yugoslav leaders were the only

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notable exception: they emerged from their hide-outs in the mountains and marched to Belgrade without needing a Soviet helping hand.

Both strategically and ideologically East Central Europe remains an important asset for the Soviet Union. At present, it is hard to imagine what kind of pressure or advantage in some other area of the world might induce the Soviet Union to abandon her hold over 100 million East Europeans. Errors, misjudgment and above all over-confidence which made Yugoslav secession from the Soviet bloc possible in 1948 are obviously to be avoided by the post-Stalin leadership of the Soviet Union.

The lesson was learned. Although Nikita Khrushchev made a serious attempt at reconciliation with Tito in 1955, he did not succeed. As the outcome of Soviet intervention against a nationalist revolt in Hungary has shown, it is easier to keep a revolting satellite within the orbit by force and settle his claim for national self-determination and the right of secession with the help of tanks than to lure back a satellite that is allowed to go astray. On June 3, 1958, Nikita Khrushchev publicly repeated the Chinese view that the denunciation of the Yugoslav Communist Party by the Cominform in 1948 was "basically correct."¹

Any rolling back of the present Soviet line in Europe is bound to be vigorously resisted as it would adversely affect not only vital strategic interests of the Soviet state but also an equally vital Soviet claim that communism represents an indomitable wave of the future—a wave which can only strike forward but never substantially recede. If another mid-European revolt against Soviet controls were ever to occur, a prompt and energetic counter-action on the part of the Soviet Union might be expected as was the case at the time of the Hungarian revolution of 1956.

Such military intervention might, of course, stain again the reputation and prestige of the Soviet Union among the leaders of neutralist nations in Asia and Africa and perhaps some Communist intellectuals. However, as seen from the vantage point of Moscow, Nehru's enthusiastic approval of a sudden Soviet dedication to Gandhi's principles of non-violence or Howard Fast's re-

entry into the C.P.U.S.A. could hardly be called an adequate compensation for the loss, let us say, of Eastern Germany or Czechoslovakia.

Furthermore, it is possible that according to the Soviet estimate, the free and neutralist world's indignation at the sight of Soviet tanks crushing revolt in Budapest was at least counter-balanced by the re-affirmation of the image of the Soviet Union as a great power which, in East Central Europe in any case, means business, uses tanks and guns, executes prime ministers after having guaranteed their survival, disregards the United Nations condemnations of her action—and gets away with it all. Such an image of the Soviet Union is bound to increase the self-confidence of those local Communists who heavily rely on Soviet support and temporarily to decrease the hopes and activities of anti-Communist majorities in East Europe.

The Soviet Aim: Status Quo

As a consequence of excesses to which the Soviet thaw of 1956 had led in Poland and Hungary, the Soviet attitude toward the maintenance and consolidation of the present *status quo* in East Central Europe has, if anything, hardened.

In the period of active, yet futile, preparation for a summit meeting in 1958, the Soviet leadership did not miss many opportunities to point out that placing the problem of East Central Europe and its relationship to the Soviet Union on the agenda of a Great Powers Conference would *a priori* condemn such a meeting to complete failure.

Speaking in Minsk, in mid-January of 1958, Nikita Khrushchev said:

What then do Messrs. Eisenhower and Dulles want? . . . They evidently want us to give up Socialist construction [in Eastern Europe] and to restore the capitalist order. Some people go so far [!] as to suggest a public opinion poll in the Socialist countries as to whether they are for socialism or capitalism. . . . If the *status quo* is not recognized, if the Socialist states are ignored, . . . and their domestic affairs interfered in, then it is, of course, absolutely [!] impossible to come to terms.

Soviet determination to crush any revolt

¹ N. S. Khrushchev's speech at the Congress of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, read over the Moscow Radio, June 3, 1958.

against Russian controls does not mean that Moscow would passively wait until an internal development in one of the peoples' democracies reaches a point of no return. Firmness is being combined with a certain degree of new flexibility. The question is whether a totalitarian system is able to be firm and flexible at the same time, that is, to recognize the virulence of rising East European nationalisms and yet to submerge them into a higher loyalty to the Soviet Union and her concept of the interest of the Communist whole.

The clash between local economic and other interests, on one hand, and the central will in Moscow, on the other, formed the background not only for the first major crisis in 1948 (Yugoslavia), but equally for the 1956 crisis (Hungary and Poland). In the middle of the Cominform's dispute with Tito in 1948 the Bulgarian Communist leader Vulko Chervenkov coined the slogan:

There cannot be true love for one's fatherland if the love is in one way or another opposed to the love of the Soviet Union.

This was an answer to Tito's assertion:

No matter how much each of us love the land of Socialism, the Soviet Union, he can in no case love his country less which is also developing socialism.²

Albeit expressed in terms of somewhat "erotic" dialectic, this is the core of the matter—and the main source of conflict, past and future, within the Soviet bloc. Chervenkov's dictum was easy to formulate. Its implementation proves difficult, as it does not quite suggest what to do when the economic, trade and other interests of a people's democracy point one way, and Soviet policy considerations point the opposite way. Even in the period of maximum relaxation the Soviet paper *Pravda* warned Eastern European Communists about the hope of their enemies for a lack of solidarity in the Communist camp.³

As in other areas of the world, nationalism and the desire for national self-determination in Eastern Europe represent a powerful force—the more so as the Soviet controls stand not only for foreign rule and foreign interests but also for totalitarian elimination of civil liberties. As the Polish and Hungarian examples show, nationalism in which the desire for national self-expression is merged

with that for individual self-determination may be occasionally and successfully buttressed by an intensive anti-Soviet nationalism of the purely xenophobic type, allied either with national communist or fascist final objectives.

Nationalism vs. Proletarian Internationalism

The conflict between nationalism, the right of national self-determination and sovereign independence on one side, and the demand for a proletarian, international discipline, on the other, was a matter of speculation and concern for the Communist leaders even prior to the emergence of the first Communist national state, the Russian Federal Republic. In the early 1920's Lenin and Stalin tended to distinguish between nationalism of ethnic groups composing the former Tsarist multinational empire and that of potential future Communist states which might emerge outside the confines of Soviet Russia proper.

Recommending finally a tight federal union for Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Georgians, the Communist leaders seemed to visualize Communist East Central Europe as a loose form of confederation. Stalin, writing to Lenin, considered inadvisable an outright incorporation of a future Soviet Germany, Poland and Hungary into the Soviet Union:

It is doubtful whether these people, with their own states, armies, finances, would—once Soviet—consent to enter into direct federal union with Soviet Russia as the Bashkirs or Ukrainians did . . . because they would see in a Soviet type of federation a device of reducing their political independence, [and] a violation of this independence . . . the most expedient form . . . would be a confederation, a union of independent states.⁴

Until the end of World War II, this problem was a subject for only theoretical discussion. In 1945, it became a matter of practical politics. While the European Communist Parties were in the opposition and in need of Soviet money, guidance and encouragement, it was relatively simple for the Soviet Union to suppress nationalist deviations as they had appeared, here and there, within the German, French or other Com-

² Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute*, "Letter from J. B. Tito and E. Kardelj" to J. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov, April 13, 1948.

³ See *Pravda's* editorial, July 16, 1958.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia*, 3rd edition, Vol. 25, p. 624.

munist Parties. The experience, power and monopoly in success gave the Motherland of Socialism and the Land of October Revolution an easy upper hand.

After the Second World War, however, the European Communist Parties emerged from their obscure status of outlawed or permanent opposition parties and in East Central Europe became leading partners in different forms of National Front coalition governments. Underground agitators became prime ministers, ministers of finance, police and defense, and secretaries of treasury. Operating within a national environment which at the end of a long war against German oppression may be described as emotionally patriotic, these Communist leaders and their partners in Moscow had to find a new formula for mutually satisfactory relationships between the Soviet Union and the Communist national states. In January, 1959, they are still in search of such a formula.

Paradoxically enough, those Yugoslav leaders who in 1948 raised the banner of nationalistic revolt against an overwhelming Soviet control, were the first ones who after the Second World War suggested a revision of Stalin's formula for a loose confederate association of independent states in favor of the constitutional inclusion of Communist Yugoslavia into the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia, Sadchikov, reported about his conversation with the Yugoslav Foreign Minister Edvard Kardelj on June 5, 1945 (one month after the end of war in Europe), as follows:

... Kardelj said he would like the Soviet Union to regard them [Yugoslav Communist leaders] not as representatives of another country, capable of solving questions independently, but as representatives of one of the future Soviet Republics, and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia as a part of the All-Union Communist Party, that is, that our relations should be based on the prospect of Yugoslavia becoming in the future a constituent part of the U.S.S.R. . . .

I told Kardelj it was necessary to recognize the facts as they are at present, namely to treat Yugoslavia as an independent state and the Yugoslav Communist Party as an independent Party.⁵

It is possible that the Yugoslav leadership might have interpreted some constitutional amendments, proposed and ratified in the Soviet Union, as paving the way for a future

incorporation of the Communist countries of East Central Europe as Soviet Union Republics.

A Confederation—*sui generis*

The right of secession was granted to the member republics of the Soviet Union in 1936, in the original text of the Soviet Constitution;⁶ the 1944 amendments (Articles 18a and 18b) gave the Soviet republics the additional right to be part of the federal union while raising their own national armies, developing their own foreign policies and maintaining diplomatic representations separate from those of the Soviet Union. These rights remained on paper.

Paradoxically, in terms of the Soviet Constitution the status of the seven people's democracies corresponds to the constitution's description of the outward signs that the sixteen republics of the Soviet Union are to enjoy. Realistically, however, only Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Byelorussia enjoy a fragment of these new constitutional rights as they are individually represented at the United Nations—a right which, somewhat inconsistently, is denied not only to Kazakhstan and Tadzhikistan but to the Russian Union Republic itself, the biggest of all Union republics.

Bearing this in mind one could argue that many aspects of the present Soviet relationship to the seven people's democracies cannot qualify under the heading of Soviet foreign policy but should be labelled intra-imperial affairs, or euphemistically, a family affair. Brushing off any non-Communist concern for the developments within the Soviet family of nations, Nikita Khrushchev, speaking with Adlai Stevenson in the summer of 1958, proclaimed a formula which seemed even more far-reaching than his speech at Minsk (quoted above). It would appear that even the foreign policies of all Communist states, including Yugoslavia, should be considered an "internal affair" of the Communist confederation. Adlai Stevenson was told at the Kremlin:

⁵ Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948, *The Soviet Yugoslav Dispute*, "CPSU to CPY," May 4, 1948, page 38.

⁶ Soviet Constitution, articles 17 ("The right freely to secede from the U.S.S.R. is reserved to every Republic"); 18 a ("Each Union Republic has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states and to conclude agreements and exchange representatives with them"); and 18 b ("Each Republic has its own Republican military formations").

It would be better not to raise questions that relate solely to us and the foreign Communist Parties. We and Tito are Communists, and somehow we will settle this affair. It is an internal affair . . . If I wrote Comrade Tito [and he emphasized the word Comrade] he would undoubtedly be shocked, and all the more so would Comrade Kadar of Hungary . . . for these (i.e., the matters you have raised, Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 and Soviet denunciation of Marshall Tito in 1958) are internal affairs.⁷

In such a framework Moscow declared her intention to treat as internal affairs: Hungary's effort to leave the Warsaw Pact and proclaim her neutrality; the Polish attempt at closer economic and cultural relations with the West; and even Yugoslav obstinacy to be Communist and yet go it alone.

The image which the Soviet Union endeavors to create both within and without its empire corresponds to Khrushchev's concept of a neo-Westphalian peace, *Cuius Regio, Eius Ideologia*, as a basis for a provisional peaceful coexistence.

This image of a Communist family, with a paternalistic source of power in Moscow, is, of course, disturbed by the continuing existence of diplomatic paraphernalia which usually exist only among really independent states: all seven East European Communist nations have their own national flags, budgets, armies, parliaments, cabinets, presidents, and, last but not least, their own Communist Parties. They have their own currencies and own five year plans although both are firmly attached to the Russian ruble and Soviet Seven Year Plan. All seven people's democracies are members of the United Nations, maintain diplomatic missions with each other and with the outside world. On March 14, 1955, under the terms of the Warsaw Pact, a unified military and planning command was added to an intricate web of bilateral, basically inter-sovereign, alliances which link the people's democracies with one another and each one, individually, with the Soviet Union. On the surface, therefore, East Central Europe appears a close knit alliance of sovereign states. As in other cases of Communist institutions and charters, one has to pierce the paper wrap-

ping to discover the reality: in their relations with the Soviet Union Communist states enjoy less autonomy and independent will than states in a federal union.

A Mosaic within the Soviet Frame

The uniformity that Soviet dominance gives over the area does not mean uniformity in the responses to it. Even in the period of maximum Stalinist rigidity (1947-1953), the people's democracies did not present a pattern of uniformity which the geographic term East Central Europe and its absorption into the Soviet power orbit seemed to suggest. There were marked differences in the timing, execution and consolidation of the Communist seizures of power; in the satellites' standards of living and emphases in economic planning; and in the outlook and experience of local Communist leaders, forced to adjust to different political traditions, and the different temperament of the people to be curbed by Communist totalitarianism.

In addition there were some remnants of intra-area feuds (minority and territorial claims). These tensions were further tainted by the fact that some Eastern European nations were treated as defeated enemies (Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania and Germany) while others (Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) were treated like allies and thus entitled to share in the Great Powers discrimination against former enemies.

Under Soviet control tensions among the satellites now lay well hidden under the surface but could be brought into the foreground whenever the Soviet conductor's baton might so order. Successful Soviet streamlining of Gomulka's Poland by installments may be explained also by the fact that the Soviet Union may at will open or close the issue of the Oder-Neisse line, separating Communist Eastern Germany from Communist Poland. In the fall of 1958 the Soviet Union certainly inspired the Albanian and Bulgarian agitation on the subject of several minority and territorial questions, especially the problem of Macedonia, as it fitted the purpose of Soviet pressure on Yugoslavia.

⁷ *The New York Times*, August 27, 1958.

As a consequence of the thaw, proclaimed by the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, following Stalin's death, East Central Europe has become even more clearly a mosaic: Poland with a relatively high degree of internal freedom for her intellectuals (although on October 8, 1958, the most prominent of Polish writers, Marek Hlasko, asked for political asylum in Berlin rather than return to Poland⁸) has very little freedom in external policies. Gomulka had finally to approve not only the Soviet-Chinese attack against Tito, and also—though reluctantly—the execution of Imre Nagy of Hungary.⁹ There is Yugoslavia with almost complete freedom in external policy but very little relaxation internally, as the severe sentence imposed on the eloquent critic of Communism, Milovan Djilas, indicates. There is Eastern Germany, a tool of Soviet foreign policy which enables Moscow to oppose any unification of Germany except on Soviet terms. There are the silent, passive satellites: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Rumania. While all of them, generally speaking, are silent, their silences have different meanings and reasons.

The Power Realities

Looking at this mosaic in January of 1959 one cannot overlook the paradoxical fact that the Hungarian and Polish revolts have proved two premises with regard to East Central Europe:

First: that man, his dignity and individuality cannot be permanently corrupted and subdued but only temporarily curbed. The desire of East Central Europe for national and individual self-expression is demonstrably strong;

Second: that the Soviet ability to control this desire is stronger still.

The events of 1956 had shown that the Soviet Union although far-seeing was not omniscient; and although very powerful, it was not omnipotent. The Soviet leaders did not foresee or were unable to prevent some events from erupting. However, following their eruption the Soviet Union had both the energy and power to stop further disintegration.

The Soviet Union seems to hold firmly the key to future developments in East

Central Europe. The Soviet leaders could conceivably be prevented from using this key only in a global context, that is if the risks and disadvantages resulting from the maintenance of Soviet power in Eastern Europe by force were not commensurate either with other risks elsewhere (e. g., decomposition of the Soviet Union proper) or with profits to be obtained in other areas of the world. There does not seem to be anything in the current evolution of the world which would suggest an early "agonizing reappraisal" by the Kremlin with regard to its posture in Eastern Europe.

While optimists may argue with some justification that the Hungarian and Polish revolts had demonstrated the basic weakness of the Soviet hold over East Central Europe, that is, over the irreconcilable character of the Eastern European desire for self-expression, the defeat of these revolts—even if everything had not been lost during the process of their liquidation—may support a contrary argument. Such argument may point to the fact that the events of 1956 reflected a preceding relaxation—or error—at the system's center—Russia; and consequently that it would be unrealistic to hope for a liberalization at the periphery of Soviet power if such a liberalization is expected to antedate or to induce a change in the center.

The final fate of the Hungarian and of the Polish revolts indicated the strength of the Soviet *veto* power over such evolution in East Central Europe which did not correspond to the needs of Soviet global policy. Thus, the Mid-European mosaic appears, in 1959, to be contained in a very solid iron framework, determined by Soviet will and might.

⁸ It is significant how strong still are East European fears with regard to Germany (fears which contribute to the solidarity of Eastern European links with the Russian protector): Marek Hlasko's defection to the West was criticized by some Polish writers because he chose to seek asylum in West Germany. *The New York Times* of October 12, 1958, quotes one writer as saying: "He knows how Poles feel about Germany and he acts as if he doesn't care."

While in the Polish case the intensity of her emotions with regard to Germany is particularly strong, as it is further augmented by a concern for the Oder-Neisse line, Soviet propaganda is not altogether unsuccessful with regard to the rest of East Central Europe in rubbing in the theme of possible German "revanchism," supported by the United States. Thus Moscow hopes that local nationalisms may find it less difficult to be submerged into a Moscow-guided internationalism, provided that this higher unity has a clearly anti-German orientation.

⁹ W. Gomulka's speech at Gdansk, on the occasion of Polish Navy Day, June 28, 1958.

In this analysis of Soviet influence in the Middle East, the following point is well made: "Many educated and politically-conscious Arabs are espousing the cause of Arab unity or Arab federation. . . . As one Arab historian . . . expressed it, the Arabs need to achieve unity before any drastic change occurs in the world power balance, and while at least one of the two great international power blocs, even if it be the Soviet, is ready and willing to promote and support the realization of their objectives."

Soviet Foreign Policy in the Arab World

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RECENT Soviet policy toward the Arab World in the Middle East and Africa, strictly speaking, is summed up in the official record, *Afro-Asian Peoples Conference, 26 December 1957—1st January 1958*, published in Arabic, English, and French by the permanent secretariat of the Conference in Cairo. This document is likewise a blueprint of future Soviet goals in the Afro-Asian World.

Ostensibly this report is a kind of Magna Carta for the dependent and semi-dependent peoples of Asia and Africa. Actually, the Conference program is strongly reminiscent of the Third International, but with na-

tionalism instead of communism as its theme, and with emphasis on Asia and Africa. Although neither communism nor socialism is mentioned, the method of achieving nationalist goals is basically that of the Comintern. In other words, Soviet foreign policy is using nationalist tools to achieve Communist objectives.

The significance of the Afro-Asian Peoples Conference, held in Cairo in December, 1957, was almost overlooked in the American press. Unlike its predecessor, the Bandung Conference of 1955, it felt the direct impact of the U.S.S.R., which played an active part in the preparation of the agenda and the drafting of the resolutions. Within a few months it became an established institution, with headquarters in Cairo, at 89 Sharia Abd El-Aziz Al-Saoud, the former palace of an Egyptian princess overlooking the historic River Nile. Its impact is already strongly felt throughout Asia and Africa.

Because of the role it is playing in the crisis that beset the Arab World, the writer recently visited the secretariat to learn at first hand what is being done to implement the decisions of the Cairo Conference. The morning's press conference, devoted to the then approaching referendum on the new de Gaulle Constitution and its bearing on France's African dependencies, was clearly designed to pave the way for the establishment in Cairo, on September 19, 1958, of the Algerian government-in-exile of Prime

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Minister El Sayed Ferhat Abbas. The proclamation of the provisional Algerian regime was accompanied by an urgent appeal from Afro-Asian Solidarity headquarters for recognition and support of the new government.

The action of the secretariat on the Algerian issue was in full conformity with its functions, as set forth by Yussef El Sebai, secretary-general, and Saad Morsi, executive secretary, of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference headquarters. They agreed that the permanent secretariat was a moral and educational force, but insisted that it was more than that. It was an executive office for the implementation of the decisions of the Cairo Conference. Its most important function was to mobilize public opinion through the various national solidarity committees established in member states, especially during crises, such as those involving the Near Eastern lands of Iraq, Lebanon and Algeria. In other words, its real job is to create an Afro-Asian public opinion, which has not existed heretofore.

The most important person on the secretariat appears to be Abrashidov Gafour, a Soviet Muslim from Tashkent, Uzbekistan, who represents the U.S.S.R. He is a man who appears to be in his early forties, fluent in English, Arabic and Russian, affable and apparently popular among his colleagues. He is the real power behind the secretariat. In other words, Soviet foreign policy toward the Arab World is being implemented today in Cairo at the headquarters of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference. Now that Cairo, in spite of occasional setbacks, is the real hub of the Arab World, with a steady procession of Arab dignitaries making their way to the presidential palace of Gamel Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic, it is logical that the Soviet impact upon that area should be exerted mainly through Cairo.

Afro-Asian Goals

The main tasks before the Afro-Asian organization today, and indirectly the main Soviet objectives, are: 1. The promotion of Arab unity; 2. The "liberation" of the remaining dependencies (Arab or non-Arab) in Africa and Asia from the control of the Western "colonizers."

Among the Arab peoples there is growing recognition of the fact that small, independent nations are in a precarious position, that their independence is qualified by the need to veer in the direction of one or the other of the two great power blocs—the Western or the Soviet. Many educated and politically-conscious Arabs are espousing the cause of Arab unity or Arab federation as the only effective means of terminating the endless intrigue, the divide and rule tactics, to which every small, independent Near Eastern state is subject under existing conditions. From Arab unity, they look for greater stability in the Near and Middle East, and for an opportunity to cope with the economic, social and political problems that override artificial political boundaries carved out by the Western powers, some of them after World War I. They vigorously oppose the imposition of any kind of outside "trusteeship," such as that proposed by some Americans, even if the trustee is the United Nations. The impression is given that the Arab peoples are sick and tired of foreign tutelage in any form, even in the guise of U.N. "observers."

At this opportune time, the Soviet Union has given its unqualified support to "the age-old aspirations of the Arab peoples for unity," to the building of a United Arab States, comprising the Arab World from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, from the Mediterranean to Central Africa. During the state visit of President Nasser to the U.S.S.R., April 29 to May 16, 1958, Khrushchev called for "the solidarity of the Arab people" under Nasser's leadership, and promised him all the Soviet aid necessary to achieve it. In return, Nasser endorsed Soviet foreign policy objectives. Together they condemned colonialism in all its manifestations, Western military bases, the French war in Algeria, and the British threat to Yemen; and they heartily endorsed the objectives of the Cairo Conference, the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arabs, and the progress of U.A.R.—U.S.S.R. economic and cultural collaboration.

To some experts in Cairo it is a matter of regret that American policy has failed to support the cause of Arab unity. The very fact that its objective is the United Arab States suggests to them the impact of the

American example rather than the Soviet. They regard it as a tragedy that we have by default enabled the U.S.S.R., a professedly atheistic and totalitarian regime, to become the champion of Arab unity in a predominantly Muslim area.

Under the aegis of the Moscow-Cairo combination, Arab leaders are working feverishly, often with manifest impatience and tactlessness, for the United Arab States. As one Arab historian and philosopher in Cairo expressed it, the Arabs need to achieve unity before any drastic change occurs in the world power balance, and while at least one of the two great international power blocs, even if it be the Soviet, is ready and willing to promote and support the realization of their objectives. Even with Soviet support, the cause of Arab unity has met with some setbacks, as in the open rift between Bourguiba's Tunisia and Nasser's U.A.R. in the Arab League in October, 1958. It is nevertheless conceded, in spite of the outcome of the de Gaulle referendum, that Moscow and Cairo have made significant gains among students and labor unions in French Africa.

In the Arab World to date, the U.S.S.R. has made its greatest headway in the U.A.R. and Yemen. There are indications, however, that all-out Soviet support for Arab independence and Afro-Asian solidarity may win for the Soviets an entering wedge in other Arab states that have hitherto rejected diplomatic relations with Communist countries and have resisted tempting Soviet offers for economic aid and closer cultural collaboration. Soviet support of the U.A.R. and Iraq during the heated Lebanese-Iraqi-Jordanian crisis of 1958 has already paid dividends in the renewal of Soviet diplomatic relations with Iraq and the establishment on September 1 of Soviet diplomatic relations with Morocco. On the other hand, the Soviet line-up with the U.A.R. forced Khrushchev to sacrifice the Communist Party of Syria, which Nasser has driven underground, exiling or imprisoning its leaders.

The Soviet Union has still another inducement to play an active role in behalf of Arab unity and Afro-Asian solidarity. This enables the Soviet regime to divert the attention of the U.S.S.R.'s 30,000,000 Muslims from domestic anti-Soviet activities to pro-Soviet missionary work among the mil-

lions of Muslims outside Soviet borders, especially in the Arab lands of the Middle East and Africa.

For the past three years the Soviet Government has exerted every effort to convince its own Muslims that they are the salt of the Muslim World, that they are the most progressive, the best educated, and that it is their mission to assume leadership of the Afro-Asian Muslims. That the Soviet regime was not entirely satisfied with the results was apparent from Radio Moscow's attack, on May 22, 1958, on Islam.

There is reason to believe, however, that Soviet efforts have not been in vain, and that many Soviet Muslims are ready and willing to substitute for the "White Man's Burden" the "Soviet Burden" in Asia and Africa. One example is Abrashidov Gafour, who is working overtime in Cairo to promote the mission. Another indication of Soviet success was provided by the "Appeal of the Muslim Spiritual Leaders of the U.S.S.R. to the Muslims of the World" against the landing in July, 1958, of American and British troops in Lebanon and Jordan respectively and a demand for their immediate withdrawal. During the Lebanese crisis, there were hints about using U.S.S.R. Muslim "volunteers" against the Anglo-American occupation forces.

Although Cairo is still the Afro-Asian headquarters, two important cultural events were staged in Tashkent, the foremost Soviet Middle Eastern center of Oriental Studies, in the late summer and fall of 1958. The first was an Afro-Asian Cinema Festival, August 20 to September 2, admittedly an experiment without sufficient advance preparation, representing eight Soviet Republics and fourteen Afro-Asian countries, including the Arab states of the U.A.R., Tunisia and Morocco.

This was followed in October by an Afro-Asian Writers' Conference, organized by Yussef El Sebai of the Cairo secretariat, where delegates from about fifty countries of the Afro-Asian bloc were represented. They came to seek common ground, a common hero, and a common genre in the literatures of the Afro-Asian peoples. Judging by the Soviet press, the real object was the mobilization of the writers for a campaign in support of Arab unity and the

independence of the remaining colonies under Western jurisdiction. It is significant that whereas only Asian delegates attended the first writers' conference in Delhi in 1955 and the first cinema conference in Peking in 1957, the Soviet Union, in particular, insisted on the inclusion of African representatives in 1958.

A careful study of Soviet sources, such as *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie*, *Sovremennyi Vostok*, and *Sovetskaya Kultura*, suggests that the ultimate Soviet objective in the Arab World is the creation of a new Middle East—one in the Soviet image. The prerequisite for this is the United Arab States, entirely divorced from the Western orbit, which will then be linked with the Soviet Middle East under Soviet Muslim leadership, that is, under the U.S.S.R. This prospect, which is present in Soviet thinking, but not spelled out for all to grasp, may well be of interest to Arab leaders who are building Arab unity with Soviet political, economic and cultural aid.

It has become apparent that the U.S.S.R. is using both its own Muslims and the eager exponents of Arab unity to promote the second main objective, the "liberation" of the entire Middle East and Africa, both Arab and non-Arab, from Western hegemony. To date, Soviet intervention is indirect, rather than direct. Soviet Muslims prod Arab Muslims, especially those of the U.A.R., to take their place in the vanguard for the elimination of the vestiges of "colonialism." Even during the Near Eastern crisis of 1958, the U.S.S.R. confined itself to press attacks on Anglo-American intervention, supported the U.A.R. before the U.N. Security Council and Assembly, and carefully avoided the landing of Soviet troops on Arab soil. It promptly recognized the new Iraqi regime, once it had been established.

Of special interest is the nature of current Afro-Asian propaganda among the Arabs and African dependencies to alienate the West from Asia and Africa. The arguments advanced against the West could have been taken lock, stock and barrel from those of the Slavophiles of nineteenth century Russia. To give just one example: The peoples of Asia and Africa are being told that Western civilization is decaying, that it is doomed to collapse, whereas there is a renaissance of

civilization in the Orient and Africa. The Soviet voice likewise joins this chorus, saying that the U.S.S.R. has cast its lot with Asia, because in Europe there is no horizon left.

The U.A.R.-Soviet cultural agreement of April, 1958, has recently borne fruit in one respect which portends important Soviet advantages in the Arab World in the years ahead. Beginning with the academic year, 1958-59, the study of the Russian language has been introduced in several U.A.R. high schools and at Cairo University, with at least ten Soviet instructors provided for the purpose. In addition, the U.A.R. in October, 1958, admitted 40 Soviet scientists and technicians to lay the groundwork for scientific and technical education. Today there is no Russian-speaking audience in the U.A.R. to facilitate Soviet instruction. There will be, however, within two or three years, when the 300 Egyptian students being sent to study in the U.S.S.R. return to the U.A.R., and when the first crop of students in Cairo is trained.

Dr. Mohammed Mursi Ahmed, Vice-President of Cairo University, advanced two reasons for the accelerated Soviet impact on the U.A.R. school system: First, as a result of the Suez crisis of 1956, there was an exodus from the country of English and French instructors at all educational levels, leaving a vacuum which the Egyptians are not yet prepared to fill, especially in the sciences.

Second, the U.A.R., according to Dr. Mursi, as he is generally called, has met with frustration in its efforts to secure first-rate American scientists, for whom there is a ready-made English-speaking audience. The University has been ready to offer salaries of from \$7,000 to \$8,000, or double the amount paid to Egyptian scholars, but this is not enough to attract the best American scientists. There is every reason to assume that if American scientists cannot be secured, within a few years top Soviet scientists will be provided and will find an audience.

In September, 1958, the U.A.R. Ministry of Education sent a delegation of 20 Egyptian educators to the U.S.S.R., led by under-secretary Ahmed Naguib, to study Soviet educational methods with a view to the revision of the educational curriculum of the U.A.R., to select Soviet universities where Egyptian students will be sent to study, and

to implement the other provisions of the Soviet-U.A.R. cultural agreement. With Egyptian teachers serving as U.A.R. political missionaries in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the early spread of Soviet educational methods to other parts of the Arab World can be expected.

In the Soviet Middle East there is a counterpart to the introduction of Russian in Cairo educational institutions. In 1957, Arabic and other Oriental languages were introduced in the public schools in Uzbekistan and elsewhere throughout Central Asia. Within a few years, the Soviet Union will have large numbers of Arabic-speaking Muslims for use in the Middle East and Africa.

The Soviet economic offensive in the Arab World, which has been accelerated since 1956, has been carefully analyzed by economic experts in the U.S. Department of State, in a recent publication, *The Sino-Soviet Economic Offensive in the Less Developed Countries* (No. 6632, May, 1958). The Soviet side of the picture has been summed up by D. Byeloshapkin in an article entitled, "The U.S.S.R. and the Economic Development of the Arab Countries," published in *International Affairs* (Moscow), in July, 1958.

Both sources agree that the bulk of Soviet aid has gone to Egypt and Syria, which now comprise the United Arab Republic. As of February 1, 1958, Egypt has received Soviet bloc aid amounting to \$485 million, Syrian aid reached \$294 million, and Yemen obtained the equivalent of \$19 million. It is significant that the total United States aid to all Arab lands was approximately one-fifth of the \$798 million extended by the Soviet bloc to Egypt, Syria and Yemen, now known as the United Arab States. The Arabs have contended that the Soviet Union has been more prompt than the United States in implementing the aid it has promised, not to mention the fact that its political position was "correct," from the Arab standpoint, during the Suez dispute and other recent crises in the Near and Middle East.

As compared with its limited aid to Arab countries, the United States over the same period advanced \$283,382,000 in aid to Israel and \$437,310,000 to Turkey. In 1958 the extension of foreign aid appeared to have a direct bearing on the allegiance of

the states of the Near East to the Soviet and Western blocs.

In order to meet Arab economic needs, the U.S.S.R. has made effective use of its European satellites to expand Soviet bloc trade with the U.A.R., Lebanon (before the crisis in May, 1958), Morocco, the Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen. The U.A.R., in particular, by 1958, had reached trade and payments agreements with practically all of the Soviet European satellites, as well as with People's China. Byeloshapkin nevertheless admitted that the U.S.S.R. "cannot as yet fill all the needs of strengthening the economic independence of the Arab states." Moreover, the Soviet Union was faced with unwelcome competition in May, 1958, when the Adenauer Government announced a grant of 400 million Deutsche marks (about \$95 million) in credit to the newly established United Arab Republic for the purchase of industrial goods in West Germany.

The announcement by Khrushchev, on October 23, that the Soviet Union would lend the U.A.R. up to 400 million rubles (\$100 million), for the construction of the first section of the Aswan High Dam served to offset West German advantages. It indicated that the U.S.S.R. had moved into the United Arab Republic with both feet.

In spite of the growing Soviet impact on the hub of the Arab World, there are still no Soviet roots in the United Arab Republic. Irrespective of the fact that official U.A.R. and American policies are widely at variance, and in spite of hostile press and radio campaigns emanating from Cairo, there is still a substantial reserve of warm friendship for the American people among Egyptians in all walks of life. If there is a desire on the part of the United States to improve relations with the Arab World and thereby steal at least some of the Soviet thunder, Americans will need to analyze and define what is meant by Arab nationalism, which, like Islam, is all-embracing, all-inclusive. The movement for Arab unity is only one aspect of it. We shall need to send trained and sympathetic representatives throughout the Arab World, not merely to establish and maintain listening posts, but to serve as ambassadors of good will. There is an Arab proverb, which says: "If you can't serve me lunch, at least smile at me!"

According to the following authority, relations between China and Russia "are extremely close." Although "the coming shift from Russian to Chinese leadership will undoubtedly impose severe strains upon their alliance . . . common ideology and increasing economic integration should tie the two nations closer together than ever, and Russian leaders thus far have shown an amazing capacity to adjust to China's changing position."

The Russian-Chinese Comradeship

By A. F. K. ORGANSKI

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OF all the relations Soviet Russia carries on with other nations, her relations with Communist China are perhaps the most important. Stability and order in the Communist world depend primarily upon the maintenance of harmony between these two giant nations. Moreover, China, already by far the largest nation on earth, bids fair to become the most powerful as well if she succeeds in completing her industrialization.

With a population more than three times as large as Russia's and almost four times as large as that of the United States, China's power potential is enormous. Whether or not this potential is realized depends upon China's success in modernizing her economy, but her current progress in this direction is impressive. Industrialization is proceeding so rapidly in the Chinese countryside that the Chinese themselves are said to be amazed.¹ The Russians are amazed, pleased and possibly a little frightened as well.

If Soviet Russia can keep an industrial China in her camp, the Communist bloc is guaranteed a preponderance of power over the current Western bloc. Under the circumstances, the importance of Sino-Soviet relations to Russia is obvious. So, too, is their importance for the United States.

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Two questions arise, however. Will China and Russia remain as united in purpose and policy in the future as they appear to be today? And will China take over from Russia the leadership of the Communist bloc?

Early Ties

Today Communist China and the Soviet Union are very close. Ties between their leaders are of long standing, going back to the period just after the Russian Revolution, when the best political and military minds of Soviet Russia—Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev, Stalin, Radek, and a host of others—studied, wrote, planned, and plotted Chinese revolutionary politics. Their writings and political agitation recruited for the Chinese Communist movement its founders and future leaders, Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Li Li-san, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li Ta-chao and many others.²

Russia did more. The Communist Party in China was young, untrained, unclear on doctrine and badly organized. To its aid came a stream of Comintern agents—Voitinsky, Maring, Roy, Borodin, Lominadze, Browder, Mandalian, Doriot, Neumann and Pavel Mif, to name only a few. For about ten years these men directly and indirectly trained the Chinese Communists, advised them and gave orders. It was they as much as Chinese leaders who ran Communist party politics in China.

At Whampoa, the Kuomintang military academy, future military leaders of the Chinese red army such as Lin Piao and Yeh

¹ Nikita Khrushchev, as paraphrased by Adlai Stevenson, *The New York Times*, Oct. 2, 1958, p. 4.

² For an excellent interpretation of the early development of the Chinese Communist Party, see Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958).

Chien-ying worked closely with the cream of Russia's military leaders, the best of whom was Bluecher.³ In Moscow, Sun Yat-sen University and Eastern University were created to train the future leaders and cadres of the Chinese revolution. The British, meanwhile, were still posting signs on the gates to the park in Shanghai reading: "Chinese and dogs not admitted."⁴

It is true that Russian help nearly wrecked the Chinese Communist movement on several occasions. It was at Russian insistence that Chinese Communists joined the Kuomintang and it was Russian blundering that gave Chiang Kai-shek his opportunity to purge the Communists. It was Moscow that ordered the formation of the ill-fated Canton commune and the abortive Communist occupation of Changsha.

Loyalty through the Lean Years

In the early 1930's, Chinese Communist loyalty to Russia was even more severely tested as Russian policy gradually swung round to supporting Chiang Kai-shek. The Chinese Communists had been forced to withdraw to a rural, mountain area so remote that contact with the Russians was lost for several years. Russian attention, meanwhile, was focused on rising Japan and even more on difficulties at home. The Chinese Communists were virtually ignored.

A Russian-maneuvered reconciliation between the Nationalists and the Communists in 1937 broke up again in 1939, whereupon the two Chinese factions went their separate and often hostile ways in their common battle against the Japanese. Russian support and material aid went to the Nationalists, not to the Communist comrades.

Nor were the Russians responsible for the rise to power of Mao Tse-tung. His creation and leadership of soviet areas first in Southern China and then, after the Long March, in Northern China were due to his own charismatic qualities and to his organizational ability. The Russian Party, looking askance at Mao's peasant soviets, granted his movement official tolerance largely because

of the successes it had already won.⁵ With the collapse of the urban Communist movement in China, for which the Russians were in large degree responsible, the Chinese Central Committee fled in 1932-1933 to the areas controlled by Mao and soon recognized him as leader of the entire Chinese Communist movement.

Mao's independent position, his agrarian base of operations, and the long years of Russian collaboration with Chiang led to the misconception, common for some years in the West, that the Chinese Communists were really "agrarian reformers" at heart. Remnants of hope still remain in the West that Mao, like Tito, might take a course sharply independent from Russia, but the hope is fading because of lack of any evidence to support it.

In actuality, China has remained loyal to the Communist movement and to the Soviet Union. And Russian leaders, whatever their past misgivings as to the viability and orthodoxy of Chinese Communism, have swung round again to full support. Somehow, the spirit of cooperation that originated when the Soviet Union played midwife and nurse to the Chinese Communist Party was preserved through the long, lean years until after World War II when Russia once again came to the aid of the Chinese Communists, turning over to them parts of Manchuria and captured Japanese military stores with which they started their successful conquest of the Chinese mainland.

Declarations of Friendship

In the past ten years the rulers of Russia and China have let slip few opportunities to declare publicly their devotion to each other. On the verbal and ceremonial level, relations could not be closer.

Even before the establishment of the Communist government in October of 1949, Mao made his "lean to one side" speech affirming that the new Chinese government would cooperate closely with the Soviet Union. Since then, virtually every major policy speech by an important Chinese official has included some bow in the direction of the Soviet Union, some reference to Soviet leadership or experience, some expression of gratitude for Soviet assistance, some statement of the importance of Sino-Soviet solidarity. When

³ See F. F. Liu, *A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956).

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁵ Charles B. McLane, *Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931-1946* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958).

Stalin died, more than half a million people attended a mourning meeting in Peking and all of China observed five minutes of silence.

Russia held up her end of the ceremonial exchange by appointing a deputy foreign minister as her first ambassador to Peking. Russian speeches, particularly since the death of Stalin, contain glowing references to China, and visiting Chinese are constantly assured of continued Russian friendship and support.

Top governmental officials of the two nations frequently visit each other's capitals. Only a few months after the establishment of the Communist government in Peking, Mao Tse-tung travelled to Moscow to negotiate a Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Aid, a political alliance of the two powers to be valid until 1980, renewable then by mutual agreement.⁶ After Khrushchev's visit to Peking in 1954, a declaration was issued reaffirming the desire of the two countries to consult on all questions of mutual interest and to preserve unity.

Economic Integration

Evidence that these declarations of friendship are not mere words is to be found in the economic realm. Chinese-Russian trade, for example, has expanded to major proportions. Today, Russia sells more goods to China than to any other nation, and conversely, China exports more goods to Russia than to any other destination. The whole pattern of Chinese trade has been drastically redirected since the Communists came to power. By 1957, roughly half of China's total foreign trade was with Russia with perhaps another 25 per cent going to other Soviet bloc nations, compared to less than 1 per cent going to the entire Soviet bloc before the war.⁷

The volume of trade between Russia and China (about \$1.5 billion annually) is surprisingly high considering that the two economies are not at present complementary. China and Russia are both exporters of raw materials and both need capital equipment. Theoretically both countries could obtain what they now buy and barter with each other more cheaply elsewhere, although in actuality Western trade restrictions have left China no alternative to obtaining capital goods from Russia.

The benefit of trade between the two nations goes mainly to China while the burden rests mainly on Russian shoulders. The Soviet Union ships to China capital goods that are important in Russia's own economic plans and absorbs part of the payment in Chinese goods she already has at home. The Soviet Union can absorb economically only about one-third to one-half of the imports she receives from China.⁸ Russian First Deputy Premier Mikoyan revealed to Adlai Stevenson in talks in Moscow that Russia reduces production in certain items at home in order to accommodate imports from China.⁹ There can be no question that China places a heavy strain upon the Soviet Union.

Not only the trade but also the transportation systems of China and Russia are being integrated. New rail construction on both sides of the border will link Chinese railroads to the Russian system at three points, thus opening up large sections of the Chinese interior for economic development and facilitating an even larger volume of Russo-Chinese trade.

Russia has also given extensive economic aid and technical assistance to the Chinese. Details on Russian aid to China are lacking, but while the total amounts involved do not appear large in comparison to American aid programs, it is clear that Russia gives more aid to China than to any other nation and that Russia represents practically the only major source of outside help for the Chinese. Soviet long-term, low-interest loans have been used to finance both capital goods and military items, though there are indications that aid in recent years has been increasingly military with capital goods being paid for increasingly through barter arrangements.

Military aid from Russia has been an important factor in increasing Chinese power and prestige. The Korean War was fought by Chinese soldiers, but without Russian

⁶ See William B. Ballis, "The Pattern of Sino-Soviet Treaties, 1945-1950," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 277 (Sept., 1951).

⁷ Alexander Eckstein in Howard L. Boorman, Alexander Eckstein, Philip E. Mosely, and Benjamin Schwartz, *Moscow-Peking Axis, Strengths and Strains* (New York: Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1957), p. 69; also *The New York Times*, Jan. 12, 1958, p. 12; Aug. 3, 1958, IV, p. 10.

⁸ Eckstein in Boorman *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

⁹ Adlai E. Stevenson, *The New York Times*, Oct. 2, 1958, p. 4.

arms and supplies they could not have achieved their successes.

The importance of Russian technical assistance should also be recognized. Perhaps the most crucial shortage in a peasant nation seeking to industrialize is the shortage of trained personnel. Russia has made up this shortage for the Chinese with a flood of engineers, technicians, accountants, economists and scientists. Again accurate totals are lacking, but here the Russian effort appears to be very large indeed compared to American technical assistance programs. And apart from the large number of Russians now at work in China, great numbers of Chinese are receiving technical training in the Soviet Union.

Political Coordination

Political coordination has also been close between the two major Communist nations. The rulers of Russia and China after all share an amazingly detailed political ideology, one that provides a background and a direction for all current political, economic and social policies. There is nothing comparable in the Western world. True, America and the Western democracies share certain basic values and a general political orientation, but agreement on details is considered neither necessary nor desirable. Not so in the Communist bloc. Every new policy and program is examined for its ideological implications and for its "fit" in the general ideological framework.

We in the West have emphasized Chinese innovations in Communist dogma and have stressed potential disagreements between Russian and Chinese theorists. In so doing we have underestimated the importance of the overwhelming area of agreement that underlies the tiny area of disagreement, and we have overlooked the importance of the fact that the Russians and the Chinese have felt it necessary to compromise all differences even in that tiny area. If England adopts a policy that does not accord completely with American political ideology, it is no great concern of ours. But if China adopts a policy at odds with Marxist-Leninist dogma, Communist theorists, both Russian and Chinese, find it necessary to reinterpret the dogma to include the Chinese view. Ideological discussion between the two nations

is constant, and ideological coordination is virtually complete.

In the realm of practical politics, coordination is also close. Chinese aims and methods in internal politics are closely patterned on Russian experience. Even innovations are often (though not always) based on knowledge gained from Russian mistakes. Chinese collectivization of the land, for example, proceeded as rapidly and as smoothly as it did partly because of lessons learned from Russian difficulties.

In international relations, China and Russia have each given the other valuable support. Chinese support of Russia was evident when China backed up Russian repression of the Hungarian revolt and sent Premier Chou En-lai to Warsaw to herd the Poles firmly back into the Soviet camp. China also supported Russian policy in the Middle East, denouncing Western action in Suez and later in Lebanon and Jordan, and offering to send "volunteers" to defend the new nationalist government of Iraq should the West attack it.

Russian support of Communist China has been evident in the Korean War, in Russia's constant efforts to obtain China's United Nations seat for the Communists, and most recently in the Taiwan Strait dispute. When Secretary Dulles warned the Chinese Communists not to risk another Korea by invading Quemoy, Russia responded that "An attack on the People's Republic of China . . . is an attack on Soviet Russia," and when President Eisenhower asked the Russians to help restrain the Chinese from military action, Premier Khrushchev replied that American troops must leave Taiwan or China would have "no other recourse" but to throw them out.

Differ as they may in private, preliminary discussions, the Russians and Chinese have presented a completely united front to the outside world in their international relations. Differences have been successfully compromised.

China's Growing Importance

It is interesting to note, however, that it is increasingly Russia that gives in to China in effecting these compromises. Russia consistently supports or tolerates behavior from China that she would not tolerate from any

other Communist state. Indeed, the entire Russo-Chinese relationship finds the Soviet Union behaving in a most unusual manner for a great power dealing with an extremely poor and relatively weak nation that is economically and militarily dependent upon it.

At the ceremonial level, China's special position is quite clear. For example, at Stalin's funeral, Chou En-lai walked in the front row along with the Russian Communist Party Presidium, an unheard of honor for a non-Russian Communist leader. In 1953, all of Russia's Presidium visited a Chinese agricultural exhibition in Moscow and stayed an hour. In 1954, most of the Presidium members attended a Chinese reception to commemorate the signing of the Friendship Treaty while the Chinese ambassador was not in attendance. Again in 1957 when Mao Tse-tung visited Moscow to participate in the commemoration of the Bolshevik revolution, the deference paid to him was obvious.

Russian trade and aid are also indicative of China's privileged position. The one-sidedness of Russo-Chinese trade and the large (for Russia) amount of aid to China have already been mentioned. Even more interesting is the fact that some of this aid finds its way into the hands of other Asian nations, not, however, as a gift from Russia but rather as a sign of the generosity and power of Communist China.¹⁰

It is also significant that Russia relinquished to the Chinese Communists all the privileges won from the Nationalists during and after World War II and that the five joint stock companies formed shortly after the Chinese Communists came to power were soon returned to Chinese control. Even Russian technical and administrative personnel are not used in China as they are in other Soviet bloc nations. Unlike their counterparts in Eastern Europe, Russian technicians in China only give advice. They do not manage or control.

China's growing importance is nowhere more evident than in the field of ideology. After a long quarrel with Russia, the

Chinese Communists won Russian toleration of their view that peaceful re-education of bourgeois elements was a legitimate means of developing socialism. In form, the Chinese gave in, accepting the Russian term, "dictatorship of the proletariat," in place of their own term, "hegemony of the proletariat," but in substance, Russia accepted the new Chinese policy. There is evidence that Stalin and Stalinists such as Molotov and Kaganovich insisted on the narrower definition, while Khrushchev and his followers were more elastic in accepting the Chinese view. One can only speculate what part if any China policy had in the disputes that brought Khrushchev to his present position of unchallenged supremacy.¹¹

Other Chinese additions to Marxist-Leninist theory have been Mao's famous speech on the presence of contradictions in socialist society and the short-lived Chinese policy of "letting a hundred flowers blossom."

Perhaps most important of all in its implications for the future is the Chinese statement first made in 1949 and reiterated in 1951 that:

The classic type of revolution in the imperialist countries is the October revolution.

The classic type of revolution in the colonial and semi-colonial countries is the Chinese revolution, the experience of which is invaluable for the peoples of these countries.¹²

This is an important claim, indeed, in view of the fact that future recruits to the Communist system are far more likely to come from underdeveloped colonies and former colonies than from the advanced, "imperialist" nations of America and Western Europe.

The Road to Dominance

Thus Communist China has made it clear that she knows best what form of communism to apply at home and that she considers her policies the best model for Asian and African (and perhaps Latin American?) nations to follow. In the last few years, China has also taken an increasing interest in the nations of Eastern Europe, applying pressure to these nations directly and also expressing to Russia her views on how the satellites should be treated. It appears that China, having first led a movement for greater toleration of satellite individuality, more recently has led

¹⁰ International Cooperation Administration, *Bloc Performance on Its Loans and Aid to Free World Underdeveloped Countries 1955 through December, 1957*, press release, Jan. 9, 1958.

¹¹ Benjamin Schwartz in Boorman *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-139.

¹² Howard L. Boorman, *ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

a move back to more rigid conformity within the Soviet bloc. In both instances, Russian leaders appear to have conformed to Chinese wishes.

Most recently of all, China has begun to interfere in Russia's relations with the West. It is difficult to explain in any other terms Russia's sudden and complete about-face last August when, after months of propaganda effort to force the West into a summit meeting, Khrushchëv, on the eve of victory, made a trip to Peking and returned to torpedo plans for the U.N. summit meeting he had seemed to agree to a few days previously. The only reasonable explanation is that Peking vetoed Russian participation in a big power meeting that would have included Nationalist China.

China's dealings with the United States have also run counter to Russia's mood. In the midst of a highly successful Russian "peace offensive," China has adopted a more truculent attitude than ever, stirring up new fears of world war by her bombardment of Quemoy and her threats to invade Taiwan. What is more, China has won Russian diplomatic support for her ferocity.

It must be concluded that Russian-Chinese relations today are extremely close. The Soviet Union is still by far the dominant nation of the Communist bloc, but China is beginning to take over some of the functions of leadership. Relations between the two nations are changing primarily because of China's rapid industrial strides and because of her success in organizing the human resources of her immense population.

Russia is giving China every assistance in her industrialization despite the fact that by so doing she is helping to create a giant that will soon be in position to dominate the Soviet Union. Russian leaders appear to be aware of what they are doing, but apparently they have decided that maintaining a close alliance with the potentially strongest nation on earth with all this means for Communist chances of world domination is more important than maintaining their own leadership of the Soviet bloc.

The coming shift from Russian to Chinese leadership will undoubtedly impose severe strains upon their alliance, but if the events of the past ten years are any indication of

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the future, it is unlikely that a serious rift between the two will develop.¹⁸ Common ideology and increasing economic integration should tie the two nations closer together than ever, and Russian leaders thus far have shown an amazing capacity to adjust to China's changing position. Indeed, they have often anticipated China's future position in their actions.

In the years immediately after the Communists rose to power in China, it was common in the West to hope that the new Chinese government would eventually rebel at Russian domination and renew China's traditional friendship with the West. Recently, we have begun to indulge ourselves with speculation that as China grows in strength, the Russians may turn to their fellow Europeans to defend themselves against Chinese domination. Both views would appear to be fantasies.

¹⁸ For a full discussion of the conditions making for a peaceful transfer of power from one nation to another, see A.F.K.Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1958), pp. 333-337.

"Continued Communist penetration of South and Southeast Asia is one of the unsettling realities of contemporary world politics," concludes this specialist, who gives a country by country analysis of the Soviet diplomatic and economic offensive in this area.

Soviet Policy in South and Southeast Asia

BY ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

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SOVIET diplomacy in South and Southeast Asia continues its post-Stalinist advance, though the extent of Soviet influence varies considerably from country to country. Impressive in Afghanistan, India and Indonesia, somewhat less noticeable in Burma, it is as yet of little consequence in Thailand, Malaya, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. Thus far, Soviet leaders have concentrated their diplomatic, trade and aid efforts on the pivotal countries of South Asia where governmental instability, strong neutralist sentiment or dire economic need offer promise of maximum political gain. They do not under-estimate the importance of Southeast Asia, which can also be used to weaken the West, enhance the international position of the Soviet Union, and significantly affect the fortunes of Asian communism. Rather, the seeming Soviet disinterest in this area appears to signify a recognition by the Kremlin of the paramountcy of Chinese Communist interests in Southeast Asia, a reflection perhaps of a Communist "understanding" over the apportionment of spheres of influence.

Before proceeding to a review of recent

Soviet foreign policy toward the principal countries of South and Southeast Asia, mention must be made of the near parallel activity of Communist China. Though a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this essay, several observations may be appropriate. First, the expansion of Communist China into Southeast Asia complements in some instances, and parallels in others (notably in Burma and Indonesia), comparable Soviet efforts. As long as the two are intimately allied, and Titoism remains but a wishful figment of Western fancy, their subversive potential and political impact are effectively strengthened. It is idle, at this juncture, to speculate on the possible consequences of a Moscow-Peking split.

Second, the impact of Communist China is greater than that of the Soviet Union in such pluralist societies as Malaya, Cambodia and Thailand, because of their sizeable Chinese minorities. These overseas Chinese constitute a potential Fifth Column whose allegiance gravitates toward Peking. In the future, this may result in Chinese influence overshadowing that of the Soviet Union. There is no intention here to detract from the significance of Soviet successes, already notable, but merely to emphasize the complexities of the region's political trends and the prospects of future Communist infiltration.

To promote its objectives, the Soviet Union has courted the good-will of the nations of the area by espousing and supporting their political aims, offering long term loans on liberal terms, and intensifying cultural and commercial exchanges. These have had the desired effect.

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India

Nowhere in non-Communist Asia has Soviet foreign policy achieved so much in so brief a period as in India. Stalin's successors early appreciated the role which a friendly India could play in enhancing the international position and prestige of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, they moved, with imagination, vigor and sophistication, to court India and to promote Soviet influence. A not unexpected concomitant of this policy was the added stature accruing to the Indian Communist Party which materially improved its prospects of acquiring political power.

The new Soviet look in India may be considered to date from September, 1953, and the appointment as Ambassador of Mikhail A. Menshikov (the present envoy to the United States and former Minister of Foreign Trade). He immediately initiated discussions aimed at cultivating closer economic relations with India. The most dramatic success was the signing of an agreement on February 2, 1955, under which the Soviet Government obligated itself to construct and finance a one million ton steel mill in the Bhilai region of Central India. This marked the debut of the U.S.S.R. as a lender of investment capital to non-Communist countries, a development of growing importance elsewhere in Southern Asia. This facet of Soviet amiability was soon supplemented by increased trade, cultural exchanges and a steady flow of technical missions.

Soviet credits to India have totaled almost \$300 million, thereby placing the Soviet Union second only to the United States in the matter of helping India to implement its program of economic development and industrialization. Psychologically, Soviet aid may be reaping disproportionate rewards. The manner in which it is expended may account for its inordinate impact. Whereas American aid has largely concentrated on helping India meet its pressing food requirements and pushing the Community Development program, Soviet credits are used to build easily identifiable and dramatized, strategically necessary, plants and industries. In addition to the steel plant, the Soviets are financing a \$120 million program designed to expand the manufacture of heavy machinery, offering \$20 million for the development of India's pharmaceutical in-

dustry, and conducting an extensive, systematic geological survey of India's oil resources. The discovery of oil last summer, by Soviet and Rumanian geologists, in the Punjab and on the west coast received much publicity, for they were events of particular importance to oil-poor India.

The value of Soviet assistance has correspondingly been emphasized. To carry out these many projects increasing numbers of Soviet engineers and technicians are being employed and more are coming. Thus far, no serious difficulties have arisen over Soviet activities. Indeed, Indian officials have been lavish in their praise of this significant contribution to India's industrial development.

There has also been a substantial increase in Soviet-Indian trade, though the Soviet bloc as a whole still accounts for little more than 3.5 per cent of India's total foreign trade. A five year trade agreement was signed on December 2, 1953, and a supplementary exchange agreement on December 13, 1955. In return for Soviet machinery, locomotives, steel and wheat, India exports hides and skins, coffee, tea and jute products. Soviet willingness to accept payments in rupees and in Indian goods is of special significance to an India harassed by a chronic shortage of hard currency. At the present time, there is nothing to indicate any Indian dissatisfaction with Soviet goods or business practices. A further expansion of trade can therefore be expected.

Soviet support of India in the United Nations, and the apparent similarity of their approach toward the questions of Chinese Communist membership in the U.N. and toward nuclear disarmament, has strengthened Moscow's diplomatic standing in New Delhi. Indeed, Soviet prestige in India soared to new heights last March, when Moscow announced its decision to suspend unilaterally nuclear bomb tests. In a country much concerned with the dangers from radioactive fallout, this announcement was greeted by Indians of all political persuasion with admiration and relief. The fact that it could readily be related to the fundamental Gandhian principle of *satyagraha* (literally, truth force), a concept holding that the way to influence an opponent is to set a proper and peaceful example, immeasurably added to its initial impact.

However, in October, 1958, Moscow rescinded the ban and resumed nuclear testing, allegedly on the ground that the United States was carrying on similar tests. Disappointment in India was widespread. The Communist-cultivated image of a well-intentioned, humanitarian Soviet Union has been noticeably deflated. This incident may induce a serious re-appraisal of basic policy assumptions among influential Indian leaders.

But despite this tactical set-back, the quest for increased influence and prestige is pushed ceaselessly. Soviet leaders stress their anti-colonialism, support Indian claims to Kashmir, and emphasize the relevancy of Soviet economic experience for India. They understand that India is the key to South Asia, and perhaps to all of non-Communist Asia as well. Behind the Soviet courtship there may well lie an uneasy and acute awareness of the lengthening shadow of Communist China's influence and power. Cultivating India's friendship would be one way of strengthening the long-range national interest of the Soviet Union. It is thus reasonable to assume that Moscow will continue its efforts to influence Indian policy and to promote the political position of the Indian Communist Party.

Burma

Lying east of India and south of China is the Republic of Burma, a country of approximately 19 million people, roughly the size of Texas. More than a decade after attaining independence from Britain, it is still torn by civil strife, factionalism and violence, as it gropes toward stability and socialism. The dominant Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League experienced a serious split last summer, the result of personality and political differences between former Premier U Nu and his rivals within the A.F.P.F.L. coalition. As a consequence, the elections, originally scheduled for November, 1958, are now set for late April. To preserve law and order and to ensure free elections, U Nu resigned and turned over the reins of government to General Ne Win, commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The assumption of power by the military stems, in great measure, from the growing subversive challenge of Burma's Communist

movement, and increases the probability of an essentially anti-Communist regime emerging from the coming elections.

In recent years, the loosely knit A.F.P.F.L. has been increasingly plagued with corruption and dissension. In addition, the Moscow-Peking oriented White Flag Communists have made ominous headway toward acquiring political power. Under the leadership of Thakin Than Tun, a former A.F.P.F.L. notable, they remain illegal as an organization but continue to operate through the National United Front, which emerged from the 1956 elections as the leading political opposition. An already confused political picture is further complicated by the disruptive activities of the Red Flag Communists (Trotskyites), the Karen National Defense Organization, and the People's Volunteer Organization.

Burma's domestic needs, strong neutralist predisposition, and temporary estrangement from the United States over the vexing problem of Chinese Nationalist forces remaining in northern Burma, combined to pave the way for closer relations with the Soviet Union. Prior to 1954, Moscow persisted in viewing Burma as a British puppet and did nothing to develop relations of any kind with the Burmese. However, with the advent of Khrushchev's amiability and flexibility, diligent efforts have been made to erase the Stalinist legacy. These have concentrated primarily on economic matters.

Taking advantage of Burma's difficulty in disposing of surplus rice in 1954, the Soviet Union (and Communist China) used this as an entering wedge and promptly negotiated trade agreements. A three-year trade pact, subsequently extended to five years in April, 1956, was signed in July, 1955. The Soviets agreed to take 400,000 tons of Burmese rice annually. In turn, they are to supply an equivalent value in Soviet machinery, industrial goods and technical services. At first, Burma encountered difficulties in its barter arrangements with the U.S.S.R. These were attributable in part to the inexperience of the Burmese Government, but they also illumined the hazards of trading with the Soviet bloc. Delays in deliveries, evidence of overpricing and poor quality, and the purchase of goods not actually needed have all dampened Burmese enthusiasm for barter deals.

As a result, with the improvement in the world demand for rice during the past two years and the increase in confidence, Burma has moved to place its trade on a cash basis.

Politically advantageous, though quantitatively small, gifts and loans are used effectively to complement Soviet trade efforts. The number of technical assistance agreements negotiated has grown with impressive frequency. During the visits to Burma by Khrushchev and Bulganin in December, 1955, and by Mikoyan in April, 1956, the Soviet Government offered to construct six special projects as a gift to Burma: these include a technological institute, a completely equipped hospital, a modern hotel and a sports stadium. Though slow in crystallizing, an agreement was signed on January 17, 1957, and it is expected that these projects will be completed by 1963. The cost to the Soviet Union is estimated at \$30 million. These are not actually "gifts," for Burma later felt compelled, for unspecified reasons, to announce that an equivalent sum would be presented to the Soviet people in the form of rice and other Burmese products. Additional Soviet credits of \$12 million have recently been granted for agriculture and for irrigation projects.

Since 1956, a growing number of Soviet bloc technicians—agronomists, construction engineers, geologists and so forth—have visited Burma in order to help implement the various programs. Soviet professional personnel are increasingly becoming an important political factor in Soviet diplomacy. For the present, the Kremlin seems content to stress the economic aspects of its "new look" and to await future developments in Burma's shaky domestic picture.

Malaya

The Federation of Malaya was granted independence on August 31, 1957, and became a member of the British Commonwealth. As such, its commitment is to the West. Since the end of the Second World War, Malaya has been afflicted with a civil war waged by a small number of Communist insurgents who recruit their members principally from among the politically deprived Chinese minority. Though economically influential, controlling much of the commerce and banking of Malaya, the Chinese have reacted to

their heritage of second-class citizenship. This, plus the enormous appeal of a unified, powerful Communist China, largely accounts for the attraction of communism for young Chinese dissidents, particularly students and intellectuals.

Until recently, the rebels brought fear and terror to much of the peninsula. During the past year, however, effective government countermeasures, a spreading disenchantment in rebel circles, and the appeal of the general amnesty offered by the newly established Malayan Government, have kept the Communists on the move and in a weakened state. The threat to the future stability of the new regime nevertheless remains serious.

Soviet influence is non-existent. The Chinese controlling Malaya's Communist movement look toward Peking. Soviet interest in Malaya is therefore marginal compared with its political interest in the "neutralist" nations of South Asia—Afghanistan, Burma, India and Indonesia. Similarly, Malaya's trade with the U.S.S.R. is presently insignificant and there is no evidence of any desire to promote cultural exchanges or enter into technical assistance agreements with the Soviet Union.

Vietnam

The 1954 Geneva Agreements ended hostilities in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, areas formerly comprising French Indo-China. They recognized the independence of these countries and partitioned Vietnam approximately along the seventeenth parallel, with the Communist Vietminh regime of Ho Chi Minh occupying the north, and the pro-Western regime the south. Since then an uneasy truce has prevailed.

Remarkable progress toward a viable, stable government has been made in the past four years in Vietnam under the leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem. Initiating an extensive program of land reform, financial and administrative efficiency, and political innovation, he has also made impressive inroads against the endemic corruption which was so much a part of Vietnamese life, and all but eliminated the once powerful paramilitary-religious sects and their disruptive activities. Considering that the general expectation following the 1954 partition was that Ho Chi Minh's Communists would soon

take over the entire country, one cannot but be almost awed by President Diem's achievements to date.

The Communist Party is outlawed, but its agents undoubtedly abound throughout the country. Diem has taken measures to reduce the once pre-eminent economic position of the unassimilated Chinese minority who, though comprising less than ten per cent of the population, at one time controlled two-thirds of the economy. At present, Soviet influence is not a factor in Vietnam. However, a Communist threat remains. It derives its principal strength from: a) the continuing danger posed by the well-armed and totalitarianized regime in the north; b) a hard core of subversives and guerrillas left behind in South Vietnam following the evacuation of regular Communist forces from south of the seventeenth parallel in 1954-1955; c) opponents of President Diem who may be sufficiently attracted by Communist propaganda and the idea of reunification to work against the present government.

Diem's astuteness and courage have enabled Vietnam to weather a critical period. He has shown no desire for closer relations with Communist China or the Soviet Union. A friend of the West, a man of honesty, devotion and ability, he must still prove himself capable of solving Vietnam's grave economic, social and administrative problems. Though he has a measure of control over the destiny of his country, the future course of Chinese and American policies in Southeast Asia looms even larger in the ultimate determination of Vietnam's future.

Laos

Lying in the shadow of Communist China, and bordered by Communist Vietnam in the east, "the land of a million elephants" has followed a neutralist, but basically pro-Western, policy since attaining independence in 1954. The influence of Communist China, however, is increasingly felt. Communist rule, if it comes, will be Chinese, rather than Soviet, oriented. Soviet influence is unimportant, and very likely will remain so. Laos falls within what may be considered as the Chinese sphere of influence. Moscow must support China's future expansion into Southeast Asia, if only to minimize potential sources of discord in Central Asia and North

Korea. Paradoxically, though both Moscow and Peking have failed to make diplomatic headway with the Laotian Government in Vientiane, the indigenous Communist movement represents a serious threat.

The present, Laotian Premier, Phoui Sananikone, excluded all Communists from his Cabinet, an unexpected departure from his predecessor's policy. Laotian Communists are under the leadership of Prince Souphanouvong, half brother of the former premier. The Communist Pathet Lao movement is now known as the Lao Patriotic Front Party (Neo Lao Hak Xat) and invested with all the rights and opportunities of other parties. Its strength seems concentrated in the two northern provinces of Samneua and Phongsaly, though infiltration into other areas has taken place in the absence of strong governmental authority. For the present, force is eschewed and power sought through peaceful and parliamentary means.

In the May, 1958, elections, the Communist sponsored groups won a dozen seats in the enlarged 59-man National Assembly. The Government is temporarily secure. But given effective Communist propaganda, superior organization, and known capacity for undermining constituted authority, the Pathet Lao might attain power through parliamentary means, thus achieving what Communist movements in Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines have thus far failed to do. Can Southeast Asian governments function, with a reasonable measure of effectiveness, in situations where Communist front organizations are accepted as part of the opposition? The Laotian experience bears careful watching, for it has an importance far beyond the immediate environs of Laos.

A poor country, plagued by malaria, illiteracy and a subsistence economy, Laos has not attracted any Soviet trade offers or loans. Laos depends upon American aid to pay and equip its army and finance the gross foreign trade imbalance. Its continued independence rests then upon a steady flow of outside support, a militarily quiescent China, and the adherence of dominant élite groups to their present policy of non-alignment. Should Laos fall, Thailand and Cambodia would become indefensible and all of Southeast Asia would be exposed to Communist

expansion. Upon so tenuous a barrier do Western hopes lie.

Cambodia

Cambodia is the smallest of the three states formerly comprising French Indo-China. It has a population of nearly six million, the bulk of whom are engaged in agriculture. Politically, the country is controlled by Prince Norodom Sihanouk known recently in the West for his jazz playing ability. Seeking to travel a balanced neutralist line between the two power blocs, he visited Peking in February, 1956, and in April a trade and payments agreement was signed. On June 21, 1956, Communist China agreed to grant Cambodia a \$22.4 million loan, thus heralding its first venture into the foreign economic aid area.

In July, during a visit to the Soviet Union, Prince Sihanouk was seemingly successful in negotiating for Soviet economic and technical assistance aid, and for a mutual exchange of ambassadors. However, the Soviet mission dispatched in November, 1956, failed to meet Cambodia's request that all aid be extended on a grant basis and there has thus far been no implementation of the agreement signed in Moscow. Apart from a promise to build and equip a 500-bed hospital in Phnom Penh, it appears that the Soviets will leave the field to Communist China. A trade agreement between the U.S.S.R. and Cambodia was finally implemented in May, 1957, but the amount involved totaled less than \$1 million.

Cambodia's Communist movement is small and unimportant. Some increased strength has been noted since the exchange of diplomatic, cultural and commercial missions with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Peking's influence among the small, strategically placed Chinese minority in Cambodia has similarly grown and represents a potential "Fifth Column." The key to Cambodia's immediate future rests in the youthful hands of Prince Sihanouk. In the past, he has vacillated between patronizing and persecuting the Communists. Should Communist influence become a factor in domestic policies, it would, as in Laos, gravitate inevitably toward Peking. For the time being Cambodia remains unaffected by Soviet diplomacy.

Indonesia

Indonesia is second only to India as a prime target of Soviet diplomacy. Its economic and political instability, civil strife and strong Communist Party all provide useful levers for Soviet penetration. The appointment of Dimitri Zhukov as the first Ambassador in September, 1954, heralded the start of a new Soviet approach to Indonesia, one emphasizing cultural exchanges, expanded trade, offers of economic and technical assistance, political support in the United Nations (particularly over Indonesia's claim to Western New Guinea which is still held by the Dutch), and shipments of military equipment. Khrushchev's imaginativeness has done much to overcome the blunderings of Stalin and erase memories of a policy which disastrously depleted the Indonesian Communist Party.

In 1948, shortly after the establishment of the Cominform and the reaffirmation by Zhdanov of the Leninist thesis concerning the irreconcilability between "capitalism and communism," the "hard" line was implemented and the Indonesian Communists revolted against the fledgling republic. The rebellion, however, was crushed and Communist influence faded from the political scene. Since 1954, Communist recovery has been rapid. In the 1955 elections, the Communist Party received more than six million votes, making it the country's fourth most important political party. It controls 39 seats in the 263 seat Parliament. Under the leadership of D. N. Aidit, Moscow's current theme, stressing the necessity of a Popular Front-type government, is assiduously followed.

The exigencies of Indonesian domestic politics inadvertently afforded the Soviet Government a golden opportunity to increase its influence with the Central Government. The demand of the outlying islands for greater autonomy, the opposition engendered by President Sukarno's controversial plans for "guided democracy" (which seeks to introduce a more authoritarian system patterned after that of Communist China and the Soviet Union), and the growing power of the Communist Party precipitated a series of widespread, inter-related challenges to the authority of Sukarno and the Central Government. With the help of

Soviet military equipment, these scattered revolts by dissident army elements have so far been put down by Sukarno. Soviet deliveries of jets, jeeps, and small arms have enhanced Moscow's prestige in Jakarta. For the time being Sukarno controls the Central Government and separatist groups remain divided and weak.

It is interesting to contrast Moscow's strategy in Indonesia with that used in India. Communist leaders in Indonesia favor a strengthening of the Central Government, hoping through Sukarno's benevolent attitude to gain access to the reins of governmental power. In India, on the other hand, Communist strategy supports the "states-righters" and "separatists" against the Central Government. A diffusion of governmental authority is sought as the best way of promoting Communist political power.

On August 12, 1956, Indonesia and the Soviet Union concluded a one-year trade agreement, their first. Subsequently renewed, it asks Indonesia to supply such commodities as rubber, tea, sugar, coffee and copra, in return for Soviet machinery, steel and transportation equipment. Trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc is small, constituting about four per cent of Indonesia's total trade. But with increased loans and credits, it will undoubtedly expand. In September, 1956, during Sukarno's visit to the Soviet Union, the details of a \$100 million development credit were announced. The agreement, however, was not approved by the Indonesian Parliament until February, 1958, eighteen months later. Designed primarily to finance imports of capital goods and heavy industrial machinery, the loan is to be repaid in twelve annual installments, commencing after a preliminary three year period. The interest rate is 2.5 per cent, the deliberately low rate usually offered by the Soviets to underdeveloped countries.

To buttress the trade and economic aid agreements, technical assistance arrangements have also been negotiated. Czechoslovak, East German, as well as Soviet experts are currently in Indonesia aiding in the construction of a number of projects. Recent reports indicate that Indonesian dissatisfaction is common. Specifically, it appears that the huge sugar refining mill constructed by the East Germans, which was opened on May

29, 1958, two years late, incidentally, has not been producing as expected. The result was rotting sugar cane and a great financial loss to the Madubaru Sugar Company. Indonesian charges of incompetence were answered by East German counter-charges of sabotage and stupidity. The Soviets have agreed to compensate the Company, but the damage has been done. In the trading realm, Indonesia seems to have benefited by the Burmese experience and has avoided any straight barter agreements. Current agreements provide for payments to be made in sterling.

Soviet President Kliment Y. Voroshilov visited Indonesia in May, 1957. Throughout his stay, he carefully steered away from any action which might seem to link Indonesian communism with international communism, though their intimate relationship is a matter of historical knowledge. His efforts were aided by an accommodating Sukarno, who lauded the disinterested and useful character of Soviet aid and praised the U.S.S.R. for its support of Indonesia's claim to West Irian. During the shipping shortage of early 1958, occasioned by the confiscation of all Dutch assets in December, 1957, and the elimination of Dutch ships from Indonesia's domestic shipping service, the Soviet Government helped by selling Indonesia ships under the \$100 million credit that Moscow had granted in 1956.

The Soviet Government, aware of the potentialities of Indonesia's precarious domestic picture, has moved with caution and done nothing to compromise the rising prestige of the Indonesian Communist Party. The pattern of loans, expanded trade and cultural exchanges will be maintained. Indonesia's future orientation may well hinge upon the allegiance of the army, and the ability of Major-General Abdul Haris Nasution, Army Chief of Staff and apparent power behind the scenes, to overcome and control the Left-wing pressures driving the country inexorably toward a more intimate and pervasive pro-Communist commitment. Indonesia continues favorably disposed toward expanded economic relations with the Communist countries, and it covets their political support in the U.N., but there is no clear sign as yet that these preferences will lead it to

(Continued on page 36)

Discussing the continuing friction between the United States and the Soviet Union, this author warns that "So long as the U.S.S.R. appears to propose peace and the United States appears to oppose negotiations, so long can the Muscovites capitalize upon appearances and create an image in the eyes of most of mankind of a pacific Communist coalition seeking to induce a bellicose American coalition to adopt the way of reason."

The Russian-American Stalemate

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THE sixteenth day of last November marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the initiation of Soviet-American diplomatic relations. The occasion was observed with mixed feelings in both capitals. The accords and the discords of 1958 mirrored in sharper focus the vicissitudes of the preceding quarter of a century in the tense and tangled contacts between the two giant powers of our world.

If it be true in human affairs that the future is the product of the present and the present is the product of the past, then the policies of the Marxist Muscovites in dealing with Washington in 1958-1959 can be rendered intelligible only by reference to the record of relations since 1933 or, better, since 1917. So formidable an enterprise is beyond our present purview. Yet a few features of a long and frustrating liaison may usefully be recalled as a prelude to a consideration of current issues.

Four decades ago the new Soviet regime,

unofficially in contact with Washington through Colonel Raymond Robins, sought recognition and aid from America against Germany. Both were denied. Following the separate peace of Brest-Litovsk, Red Moscow, while cherishing vain visions of imminent world revolution, was obliged to fight for survival, 1918-1921, against the American and Allied intervention and blockade. In the 1920's Soviet policy vis-à-vis the West strove for peaceful "co-existence," recognition and trade. The United States granted generous famine relief and permitted limited trade through Amtorg, but long withheld recognition out of moral abhorrence of "Bolshevism"—with no visible effect in weakening the Soviet state or causing it to disappear.

The Roosevelt-Litvinov agreements of November 16, 1933, bespoke cooperation for "mutual benefit and for the preservation of the peace of the world." They were inspired, particularly on the Soviet side, by hopes of political collaboration in checkmating Japan and the Nazi Reich. American isolationism foredoomed all such expectations.

Within two years Moscow and Washington were wrangling angrily over debts, claims, credits and the Comintern while the Fascist warlords pushed their preparations for conquest. Ambassador William Christian Bullitt left his Moscow post in 1936 disillusioned and embittered and soon became an early and ardent anti-Soviet "cold warrior." His successor (1937-1938), Joseph E. Davies (who died May 9, 1958), fostered better relations and subsequently helped arrange the "Summit" conferences at Teheran and Potsdam—for which services he was awarded the Order

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of Lenin by Moscow and the Order of Merit by Washington.

Meanwhile both Powers had become reluctant allies against common foes in a war which both had sought to evade but which neither had been willing to avoid by timely joint action in their own mutual interests. The lost opportunities of the pre-war years were paralleled by the lost opportunities of the post-war years, with each side, as before, accusing the other of prime responsibility for friction and tension. Insofar as the continuing "war after the war" can be attributed to the decisions and indecisions of 1938-1948 rather than to the reciprocal hates and fears of earlier decades, the post-war pattern of power can be reduced, not inaccurately, to a relatively simple formula.

While the United States sought to "keep out of other people's wars" through "neutrality" legislation which unwittingly aided the Fascist aggressors and penalized their victims, Britain and France, equally unwilling to form a viable alliance with the U.S.S.R., surrendered Eastern Europe to Hitler at Munich. *Der Fuehrer* in 1939-1941 used his opportunities to make a "bargain" with Stalin, to strike down Poland, to conquer the Continent, and finally to attempt the annihilation of the Soviet Union.

In the sequel it was clear that if Hitler won his war all of the *Ostland* would be ruled by Fascists and that if Stalin won his war all of Eastern and much of Central Europe would be ruled by Communists with the Western Powers in either case excluded from all influence in an area they had already abandoned—unless Britain and America could effectively invade Nazi Europe before the Russians reached the Elbe. This was not to be. What the West relinquished in 1938 and what Berlin seized in 1939-1941, Moscow occupied in 1944-1945 and ruthlessly converted into a *cordon sanitaire* in reverse against the West.

The Atlantic Powers, now led by the United States, refused after 1945 to accept the decision of arms and dedicated their energies to "defense" against a new menace and to persistent, albeit futile, efforts, to "roll back" the tide of communism, to "liberate" Eastern Europe, and to restore some facsimile of the *status quo ante bellum*. American power, supplemented by Western

European power, was, and is, inadequate for any such endeavor. Soviet power, supplemented by the dubious power of the "satellites," was, and is, quite adequate to maintain the *status quo post bellum*. The "Cold War" has been from the beginning, and remains today, a contest of wills in which policy-makers in Washington seek (unsuccessfully, thus far) to reverse the verdict of 1945 while policy-makers in Moscow seek (successfully, thus far) to perpetuate the verdict of 1945.

Objectives Today

Soviet foreign policy since 1945—as George Kennan has repeatedly pointed out and as even John Foster Dulles in an earlier mood (1949-1950) conceded—is not devoted, contrary to prevailing American mythology, to the military conquest of Western Europe and the world. Soviet foreign policy, like that of all other Powers, is dedicated to maximizing Soviet power and to minimizing the power of potential enemies. In the view of the men of Moscow this purpose can best be served in our time by maintaining the European *status quo*, by buttressing alliances with Communist China and European "satellites," and by negating American efforts to mobilize Arabs and Asians against the U.S.S.R.

But the staff of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs—ensconced in Moscow's first "skyscraper" (1951) on Smolenski Boulevard and directed in recent years by the fallen Molotov, the ousted Shepilov, and the professional Gromyko—has long been pursuing, and continues to pursue, another purpose: that of negotiating a *modus vivendi* with the West (i.e., with the United States) which will, it is hoped, diminish tensions, reduce armaments, and promote peacefully competitive "co-existence" in economics, science, technology, and aid to impoverished peoples in place of dangerously militant rivalry in the amassing of nuclear arms and in the art of "brinkmanship."

This goal, critically considered, is wholly consonant with the broader purposes of Soviet foreign policy and is wholly serious and "sincere" as a rational delineation of national interest within prevailing patterns of power. It is neither a "gimmick" nor a "trick" to weaken the West and pave the

way for Communist "conquest of the world" —a phantasy no longer taken seriously by anyone save professional anti-Communists.

The advantages to Moscow of a *modus vivendi* are blindingly obvious. In the event of a "settlement," resources devoted to armaments could be diverted, with no such dislocations as would occur in the American economy, to further industrialization and to consumers' goods. A reduction of tension, so Khrushchev assumes, would weaken the Western alliance. Any dramatic negotiations, moreover, even if devoid of concrete results, would tend to legitimize the *status quo*, diminish Western hopes of unifying Germany and "liberating" Eastern Europe, imply Western acknowledgment of Soviet interests in the Mideast, and create a desired public image of "equality" between the Communist bloc and the Western coalition. In all of these, and in sundry other respects, the rulers of the U.S.S.R., as they see the shape of things to come, have everything to gain and nothing to lose from a negotiated termination of the "Cold War."

The crucial question, clearly, is what price the Marxist masters of Muscovy are prepared to pay for such a settlement. The answer would seem to be that they are unwilling to sacrifice any significant positions or components of Communist power in Eurasia, as they would be obliged to do were they willing to negotiate about maximum or even minimum aspirations regarding Germany, Eastern Europe, the Levant and the Far East. Since these aspirations have been adhered to with singular tenacity by Washington administrations of both parties since 1945, followed ambivalently by London, Paris, Bonn and Rome, the Muscovite posture might appear to offer little opportunity for bargaining.

While this may in truth prove to be the case (barring some improbable shift of Soviet or American attitudes), a possible "middle ground" is nevertheless discernible through the murk of public propaganda and secret diplomacy. Its contours center since the demise of Stalin in the concepts of "disengagement" and "neutralization," both of which have ardent Western and even American advocates. In the Austrian Treaty of May 15, 1955, the U.S.S.R. withdrew its troops from the *Ostmark* in exchange for Western

withdrawal and Austrian abstention from alliances. Sweden, Finland (with qualifications), Switzerland and Yugoslavia enjoy a comparable status.

The men of the Kremlin currently envisage a "settlement" in terms of a negotiated extension of such a status to Germany, Scandinavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy, perhaps Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, and the states of the Middle East, with foreign troops removed, foreign bases closed, alliances renounced, and East-West safely separated by a broad "neutral" zone through Central Europe and the Levant.

This conception, although thus far unacceptable to Washington, is not *per se* incompatible with American and Soviet interests alike. Since some Americans and more Europeans are favorably disposed toward such a "solution" as preferable to the hazards of an unlimited arms race and an unmitigated rivalry for power, the Marxists of Muscovy are not unrealistic in pursuing a purpose which may, eventually, prove palatable to Western opinion-molders and policy-makers. This, at any rate, is Moscow's current course.

Ad Astra Per Aspera

During the past year the men of Moscow have employed every possible device of propaganda and pressure to induce the men of Washington to consent to another "Summit" conference. The U.S.S.R. lost little and gained much from the session of July, 1955, even though the "Spirit of Geneva" had a short life-span. Another such venture would serve Soviet purposes. The record of recent efforts to effect such a consummation is far too voluminous to admit of brief summary. Only a few "high points" can here be indicated.

Bulganin's epistle of December 10, 1957, to Eisenhower, with variants to London and Paris, proposed a "high level" meeting of "leaders of Powers" to resolve East-West differences. This communication was followed by a veritable flood of Soviet proposals during 1958. On January 9 Bulganin circularized 19 capitals with an elaborate program for an East-West non-aggression pact, a Central European zone free of nuclear weapons, a ban on nuclear arms and tests, and a joint embargo on export of weapons to the Mid-

east. On January 31 Khrushchev conceded the need for some delay and preparation, but insisted that such a meeting was imperative within the next few months.

Bulganin to Eisenhower, February 3, urged immediate negotiations on his previous proposals to prepare for a "Summit" session. In mid-February Poland, soon supported by the U.S.S.R., reiterated its suggestion (the Rapacki Plan) of October 2, 1957, for a denuclearized zone in Central Europe. On March 1 Moscow proposed a meeting of Foreign Ministers to prepare for a "Summit" conference. Further Soviet notes followed: Bulganin to Eisenhower, March 7, pleading for "peace"; mid-March missives on space control and overseas bases; a refutation of Western objectives, March 24; and sundry later communications reiterating earlier pleas. Since all Soviet notes and all Western replies were immediately made public, all sophisticated laymen knew that the parties were not engaged in negotiations, which must always be private, but were involved in a propaganda contest to win friends and influence people.

The net results of the Soviet campaign were meager, albeit not negligible. Moscow on May 31 assented to a United States proposal for a meeting of scientists to consider the problem of international inspection to supervise a ban on nuclear tests. The meeting began in Geneva on July 1 and closed six weeks later (while Khrushchev exchanged letters with Eisenhower on prevention of "surprise attacks") with the scientists' conclusion that effective international supervision to insure observance of a cessation of tests was feasible. Moscow agreed to begin talks in Geneva on October 31 on suspension of testing, with Washington and London agreeing to refrain from testing for one year thereafter, and perhaps longer, if Moscow would concur—conditional upon progress toward a system of effective inspection. Agreement was meanwhile reached to begin negotiations in Geneva on November 10 for international arrangements to guard against "surprise attacks."

In the interim the "Summit" was lost sight of in the fogs of new "crises." In the wake of the Iraqi revolution of July 14 and the dispatch of United States and British troops to Lebanon and Jordan, Moscow pro-

posed a "Summit" meeting to deal with Middle Eastern issues. Eisenhower countered by suggesting a "Summit" session in the United Nations Security Council. Khrushchev tentatively agreed, but after spending four days in Peking in early August informed Eisenhower, Macmillan and de Gaulle that the U.S.S.R. had decided to reject a "Summit" meeting within the framework of the Security Council, which he characterized as a "tool" of United States foreign policy and useless without the participation of Communist China. The new "crisis" in the Straits of Formosa in late summer evoked new threats on both sides and a solemn Soviet warning that any American attack on Red China would be deemed an attack on the U.S.S.R. It made the coveted top-level conference more remote than ever. No new "Summit" meeting had come to pass by the turn of the year nor did any seem in prospect in the early months of 1959.

Response to Challenge

The official American rejoinder to Soviet proposals and pressures has remained consistently negative (save for the exceptions already noted) with the posture of negation thinly disguised by various counter-proposals known in advance to be unacceptable to Moscow. Dulles constantly belittled a top-level conference as "futile." Eisenhower, now guided *in toto* by the Dulles dispensation, told Bulganin (January 12, 1958) that a "Summit" meeting must be carefully prepared on lower levels lest it lead to "disillusionment, dejection, and increased distrust." In February, Washington rejected the Rapacki Plan as "extremely dangerous" while Eisenhower (February 17) asked for a cessation of "repetitive public debate" and for "less formal and less publicized contacts."

Early March found Washington evading, with some embarrassment, offers from the Soviet leaders to come to the United States for a conference and rejecting the Soviet proposal, originally made by Washington, for a Foreign Ministers meeting in April on the ground that Soviet conditions offered no hope of agreement. Russian suggestions regarding disarmament and international control of outer space were found "unacceptable." Dulles opined (March 25) that the United States would "lose its shirt" if it

agreed to a conference on Soviet terms and denounced Moscow (April 15) for "having debauched and prostituted into purely an organ of propaganda" the customary channels of diplomatic communication.

The rest of the record is all of a piece. While recent United States foreign policy is open to charges of inconsistency in other fields, in the matter of a "Summit" conference or even a meeting of Foreign Ministers the answer of the Eisenhower Administration has been clear and unequivocal: "Nyet!"

The Mystery of Motivation

Since it is self-evident to all that persistent refusal to "negotiate peace" puts the negator in an unfavorable light, the record of American negativism raises puzzling questions regarding the considerations in the minds of Washington policy-makers which account for, and presumably justify, such a course. The answer of Soviet politicians—i.e., that Washington is "plotting war"—is plainly absurd, even though Soviet leaders, who see the world through distorting lenses of Marxism-Leninism, may genuinely cherish such an anxiety. No clear answer is available to outside, or even inside, observers, since clarity regarding ends and means has not been a conspicuous characteristic of the Eisenhower administration in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. Several clues may nevertheless be noted.

American policy and opinion continue to reflect what D. W. Brogan once called "the illusion of American omnipotence." If America is believed by most Americans to possess power to impose its will on the outer world, then it is obviously unnecessary to negotiate with Russia (or with China) as an equal or to negotiate at all—since all negotiation presupposes bargaining and compromise on terms short of the "unconditional surrender" of the other side.

Contemporary America remains committed to goals which are non-negotiable with Moscow and Peking: the unification and rearmament of Germany in alliance with the West against the East; the "liberation" of Eastern Europe; the exclusion of the U.S.S.R. from all voice in Mideastern affairs; the alignment of all the non-Communist world in a military coalition against the Red Men-

ace; the "liberation" of China; and, ideally, the ultimate overthrow of Communist power everywhere. The demonstrated fact that American power is insufficient to achieve all, or any, of these purposes has not (thus far) been sufficient to persuade Americans committed to these purposes to abandon them. So long as they are pursued, all serious negotiations with the "enemy," equated with Evil incarnate, are precluded by the canons of morality and the dictates of expediency.

A possibly more compelling imperative in the minds of American policy-makers is fear rather than hope. The fear is less a fear of Communist schemes of world conquest than a fear of irresponsibility on the part of Americans and of mounting indifference on the part of America's allies. Any "outbreak of peace" by way of "disengagement" and "neutralization" might well be expected to have the following consequences: a sharp reduction of United States military expenditures, with no compensatory increase in civilian expenditures, thus confronting the American economy with a dismal prospect of stagnation; a resurgence of "isolationism" in an America no longer dramatically threatened with attack from abroad; an enhancement of "neutralist" sentiment not only among the "uncommitted" nations but even among America's allies, with a resultant weakening of the Atlantic Alliance; and, potentially, a disintegration of the "Free World" coalition to a point at which the "enemy" might be tempted to new ventures in aggrandizement under conditions offering him an opportunity to dominate Europe, Asia and even Africa, and to place the "American way of life" in mortal jeopardy.

Such calculations are no less real for being unspoken. As long as they persist in the thought and action of Western policy-makers, they preclude any negotiated *modus vivendi* with the U.S.S.R. They require continuing tensions and frictions, recurrent crises of "brinkmanship," and inflexible opposition to, or evasion of, all Communist overtures. As long as the attitudes and assumptions underlying this orientation persist, the "Cold War" will continue to be regarded by Washington as a moral, political, diplomatic and economic necessity. Under such circumstances no "Summit" conference and no otherwise contrived resolution of cur-

rent animosities between East and West is within the realm of the politically possible.

Shto Dyelat? (What is to be done?)

What then may we expect the policy-makers of Moscow to do in the face of the demonstrated impossibility (save in minor matters far removed from the realm of high politics) of negotiating a settlement with Washington? The record of the past as a guide to the future suggests that they will neither resort to total war—since they know, as do the rest of us, that war in the atomic age means the co-annihilation of the belligerents—nor will they yield to American demands as currently defined for the sake of an accord.

The Marxists of Muscovy will long persist in their endeavors to reach the "Summit" and to negotiate, somehow, a relaxation of East-West conflicts. They will regard continued failure in the endeavor less as a liability than an asset. So long as the U.S.S.R. appears to propose peace and the United States appears to oppose negotiations, so

long can the Muscovites capitalize upon appearances and create an image in the eyes of most of mankind of a pacific Communist coalition seeking to induce a bellicose American coalition to adopt the way of reason.

Moscow can play this game throughout 1959 and far beyond, with results prospectively advantageous to the U.S.S.R. and disadvantageous to the United States. In January, 1959, all that could safely be said of the American response was that it was inadequate to the exigencies of the occasion. Under the circumstances of the human condition and of the equipoise of power in a bi-polar world, the rulers of Russia are no more likely than the rulers of America to realize their ultimate ambitions. But they challenge America to meet their competition in ways other than the ways of negation. If the challenge can be met constructively, the inevitably continuing rivalry between the Super-Powers—far from menacing humanity with thermonuclear genocide—can promote the health, wealth and happiness of all mankind.

(Continued from page 30)

reorient its trading pattern toward the Sino-Soviet bloc for political considerations.

Concluding Remarks

Continued Communist penetration of South and Southeast Asia is one of the unsettling realities of contemporary world politics. At present, there is little to differentiate between the Chinese and Soviet variety. Both seek to subvert the present non-Communist governments of the area. The Soviet Union has concentrated its diplomatic efforts on Afghanistan, Burma, India and Indonesia. Careful not to offend or to irritate needlessly, its approach bears the imprint of shrewd, imaginative planning, of vigorous implementation, and of a sensitivity to Asian attitudes not usually associated with Soviet behavior.

Economic aid has been granted without any visible political strings; the technicians sent are invariably well-trained and briefed

on local customs and traditions; the expansion of trade and the extension of Soviet credits have been carried out on a business like basis, an approach of some significance to countries eager for the intangible of equality. These factors must be appropriately assessed in any over-all appraisal of the Soviet impact, present and potential, on this crucial area.

Lenin often sought to identify the Soviet Union with nationalist aspirations and with the independence movements in underdeveloped countries. On one occasion, he stated that "We will apply all our forces to become close to and to unite with the Mongols, the Persians, the Indians, and the Egyptians. We consider it to be our obligation and to OUR INTEREST to do this because otherwise socialism (communism) in Europe would be unstable." This tradition is evident in the magnitude and resourcefulness of post-Stalinist policy in South Asia.

WALL MAPS

<i>Number</i>	<i>Area</i>	<i>Size</i>
HPe55	China, Physical-Political (a NEW map!)	86 x 64"
P55	China, Commercial and Products	36 x 48"
P80r	Far East, Physical-Political	36 x 48"
HP80	Far East, Physical-Political	82 x 88"
S52rp	U.S.S.R., Physical-Political	64 x 44"
RL52	U.S.S.R., Relief-Like	96 x 68"
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H52	Soviet Union in Maps (Philips' Atlas) ppd.	\$1.00

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Since World War II, Russian and American efforts to reach a disarmament agreement have been in conflict. The Russians insist on a nuclear ban as a first step while the United States presses for a workable inspection system. As this author concludes, "Unfortunately, the 15-year old deadlock over disarmament cannot be broken while the Soviet Union and the United States continue to pursue conflicting goals."

A History of Disarmament Proposals

BY CAROL L. THOMPSON

Editor, *Current History*

FOR almost fifteen years, the Soviet Union and the United States have preserved an illusion of interest in disarmament; at the same time each nation has invested an enormous amount of time and money in an accelerating arms race. Neither Russian nor American foreign policies with their conflicting goals offer any hope for meaningful disarmament. As long as the Russians concentrate on rockets, intercontinental ballistic missiles and a nuclear-armed submarine fleet, American policy makers dare not take even a first step toward disarming. And as long as Americans arm some 250 military bases overseas, sponsor Nato and build a strategic air arm and nuclear submarine fleet, the Russians see themselves in mortal danger.

The history of disarmament negotiations for the past 15 years mirrors the impossibility of disarming in a world community ravaged by basic conflicts of interest. This soon became apparent as the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union began to consider methods of reducing armaments at the close of the Second World War.

The maintenance of a veto power in the United Nations Security Council precluded the kind of effective world organization envisaged by supporters of "world government," yet American and Russian insistence on a veto was an effort to create a realistic structure in a world dominated by two Giant Powers. Granted that the veto precluded a federal world government it did not, in the opinion of United Nations planners, automatically doom efforts at gradual disarmament.

What was the armament situation at the close of the war in 1945? The Axis powers—Germany, Italy and Japan—were defeated

and disarmed; they posed no arms problems for the victors. It is one of history's ironies that since 1945 the victors have been concerned not to disarm but to rearm their former enemies. In 1945, the Soviet Union had the largest army in the world, with 15 million men under arms. The United States had 12.124 million men in arms; its greatest strength lay not in men, but in its monopoly of the world's newest and most terrible weapon—the atom bomb. In fact, the whole problem of post-war disarmament was enormously complicated by the American development and use of atomic bombs in August, 1945, at the close of the fighting with Japan. For this reason, Russian and American efforts toward disarmament were first focused on control of atomic energy.

At the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December, 1945, the U.S.S.R. reached an agreement with the United States and the United Kingdom to establish an Atomic Energy Commission under the auspices of the United Nations. This 12-nation Commission was set up in January, 1946; its members were the members of the Security Council plus Canada.

The United States representative on the Atomic Energy Commission was Bernard M. Baruch, and before many months had passed he and his advisers came forward with what later became known as the Baruch plan for atomic energy control. This plan, presented to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission in June, 1946, called for an International Atomic Development Authority, an end to the manufacture of atomic weapons, and eventual destruction of all existing weapons.

The International Atomic Development Authority was to have very broad powers,

including the control, inspection and licensing of all atomic activities, international control or ownership of potentially dangerous nuclear activities, control of nuclear raw materials and "primary nuclear production plants," power to direct nuclear research. The United States would destroy existing weapons, but only after an "adequate" international control system had been established. As the State Department saw it:

This U.S. offer which, if accepted, would have meant the removal of the nuclear threat at the very outset, would have allowed the nations of the world to enter the nuclear age in a joint and peaceful endeavor.¹

The Russians, who rejected the Baruch Plan, saw it very differently. Soviet Professor D. V. Skobel'tzyn recently described the "underlying idea of the Baruch plan" as "the idea of lasting monopoly of atomic weapons and of atomic supremacy."² The Russians were not willing to let the United States be the only power with the know-how for assembling nuclear weapons, even if the Americans subsequently destroyed their stockpile. Soviet military authorities were also unwilling to authorize an International Atomic Development Authority and to stop Russian nuclear research unless all existing bombs were first destroyed.

The Russian view was expressed very shortly, when the U.S.S.R. countered with a Draft Convention on Prohibition of Atomic Energy for the Purpose of Mass Destruction, calling for the immediate destruction of all existing bombs, and a general prohibition on atomic weapons, and suggesting that the "principle of unanimity" (i.e., the veto) should apply to decisions on atomic energy.

While Russian and American research on nuclear weapons went forward, the United States and the U.S.S.R. refused to modify their respective positions on nuclear weapons control. A Russian plan submitted in June, 1947, reiterated Russia's 1946 proposal. In November, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly in effect adopted the United

States plan for atomic weapons control despite Russian opposition. A year later, in 1949, the deadlocked Atomic Energy Commission suspended further discussion.

Could atomic energy control have been established during this period? In the light of international tensions, it was not realistic to expect the Soviet Union to restrict nuclear weapons development, given American monopoly of the A-bomb. Perhaps the United States did not expect Russian acquiescence. As British physicist P. M. S. Blackett pointed out, there was in the United States "a strong military and political group . . . that preferred an old-fashioned national arms race. . . ." It was widely rumored that Baruch's plan was made "so stiff that even the Russians won't be fool enough to fall for it."³ In the absence of international controls, the United States put its faith in the American ability to maintain a lead if not a monopoly in nuclear weapons development. For their part, without international controls, the Russians were able to devote the potentials of totalitarianism to similar research.

Thus the U.S.S.R. and the United States chose to go their own ways, rather than mediate their common difficulties in setting up international controls on nuclear weapons. The first result of this policy, in September, 1949, was the Soviet A-bomb test that signalled the end of the American monopoly. Thermonuclear weapon development followed.

One reason that the United States was chary of nuclear weapons control was the enormous advantage accruing to the U.S.S.R. in conventional land forces. As far as can be judged, the Russians today have some 3.8 to 4 million men under arms, including 2.5 million soldiers in 175 ground force line divisions.⁴ In contrast, today the United States has some 2.6 million men in arms, with 14 Army divisions and three Marine divisions. With this discrepancy in manpower, the United States may hesitate to surrender whatever advantage it may see in nuclear superiority.

Conventional arms reduction was not discussed until late in 1946. In December of that year, the U.N. General Assembly asked the Security Council to consider proposals for "practical and effective safeguards in connection with the control of atomic energy

¹ "Disarmament, the Intensified Effort," Wash., D. C.: Department of State 6676, July, 1958, p. 3.

² D. V. Skobel'tzyn, "A Chain Reaction of Errors," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September, 1958, page 248.

³ P. M. S. Blackett, *Atomic Weapons and East-West Relations*, New York, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1956.

⁴ Allowing for the announced reductions of 1.84 million in 1955-1956. See Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, N.Y., Frederick A. Praeger, 1958, page 150 ff., and Hanson Baldwin, *The Great Arms Race*, N.Y., Frederick A. Praeger, 1958, page 37 ff.

and the regulation and reduction of armaments."⁵ The Soviet Union took the position that conventional arms reduction should be considered in relation to nuclear weapons control; the United States maintained on the contrary that the Commission for Conventional Armaments⁶ should not deal with atomic energy matters. The United States view prevailed when the Security Council set up the Commission with the Soviet Union abstaining from voting.

Leading from the strength of its armed force superiority, the Soviet Union suggested in 1948 that each of the Powers should reduce its arms and armed forces by one-third. This suggestion was opposed by the United States. When the Third General Assembly suggested taking a census of arms and armed forces, the Soviet Union again objected.

The Korean War marked a temporary suspension of interest in arms control. But even during the war, a new consolidated Disarmament Commission (1952) was asked to construct a draft convention "for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction and for effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only." In the years immediately following, the United States proposed stages of gradual disarmament in the nuclear and conventional fields, but the U.S.S.R. rejected every suggestion.

In April, 1952, the United States suggested a five-stage system of gradual disclosure of information about arms and armaments. International inspectors with "access to the entire national territory" of each state would verify the information. The next month, the United Kingdom, and France joined the United States in proposing force levels for five nations including themselves, the U.S.S.R. and China. These proposals would have provided maximum ceilings of from one to one and a half million men under arms in the United States, China and the Soviet Union, and 700 thousand to 800 thousand for the United Kingdom and France.

In October, 1952, the United States summarized what it considered "Essential Principles for a Disarmament Program," in-

cluding "prevention of war by relaxing tensions and fears created by armaments." In the American view,

... a disarmament agreement should provide for a progressive, balanced and coordinated program in order to avoid any disequilibrium of power; and an effective system of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification should be a part of a disarmament agreement.⁷

Russian views of the essentials of a disarmament program remained in sharp contrast. Methods of inspection, according to Soviet officials, would let other nations discover military preparations in the U.S.S.R. and would help Western nations conceal their own military moves; reductions of armed forces were of much less importance than neutralization of American overseas bases and the abandonment of the military alliance, Nato; all conventional arms reduction was insignificant unless an agreement could be reached to ban the use of thermonuclear weapons. President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" proposal (1953) setting up the International Atomic Energy Agency provided the Russians with still another occasion for demanding a ban on the use of nuclear arms.

Preventing A Surprise Attack

In 1955, both the U.S.S.R. and the United States began to move away from the problem of nuclear disarmament because, as the Soviet Union phrased it:

... There are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading control and for organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even if there is a formal agreement on international control.

Prevention of surprise attack and the establishment of an "early warning system" were considered more important after 1955 by the Soviet Union and by the United States. A Russian proposal of May, 1955, "in order to prevent surprise attack," called for the establishment by an international agency of

control posts at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways, and in aerodromes
... to ensure that no dangerous concentration

⁵ General Assembly Resolution 41, December 14, 1946.

⁶ The Commission for Conventional Armaments was established February 13, 1947.

⁷ Department of State, *Ibid.*, page 4 ff.

of military land forces or of air or naval forces takes place.

At the same time, the U.S.S.R. asked the United States to withdraw from foreign military bases and to ban nuclear testing. Nuclear weapons were to be used only for "defense against aggression" and then only subject to a Big Power veto, i.e., "when a decision to that effect is taken by the Security Council."

President Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal, calling for aerial inspection and photography and an exchange of military establishment maps, was also aimed at "early warning" and prevention of surprise attack. The United States subsequently indicated a willingness to incorporate the Soviet plan for ground control stations into the "open skies" scheme.

In a series of letters from Russian Premier Bulganin, Soviet objections to the "open skies" plan were detailed. Perhaps most important, the Russians insisted on a ban on nuclear weapons as a prerequisite for disarmament negotiations. They felt that aerial inspection would force nations to greater arms efforts and that erroneous reports of arms build-up might trigger war hysteria.

Armed Force Reductions

With disarmament negotiations deadlocked, the U.S.S.R. in May, 1956, announced that Soviet armed forces were being cut 1.2 million and the following month Premier Bulganin asked other nations to follow suit: "each one taking concrete measures for reducing armaments, which measures could be carried out without waiting for the conclusion of an international agreement on disarmament." It was impossible to determine whether the Russian armed force reduction was actually accomplished and if so, what the new armed force total was. There was no doubt however that Russian land forces were still far stronger than comparable Western forces. American and British forces have been reduced to levels recommended by the Disarmament Commission.

In the spring and early summer of 1957 there was some indication that the Soviet Union and the United States were closer to agreement. In May, at a U.N. Disarmament

Subcommittee meeting, the United States suggested international controls on troop movements and arms shipments, and John Foster Dulles suggested testing aerial inspection in Alaska, Canada and Siberia.

The Soviet Union responded with the demand that mutual inspection must be set up on a "mile for mile" basis and suggested a demilitarized zone around West and East Germany. But in the discussions that followed neither side retreated far from its original stand: the United States continued to make suggestions for some "early warning system" and an inspection system and for step by step nuclear disarmament; the Soviet Union continued to ask for neutralization of Central Europe, American withdrawal from overseas bases and the immediate banning of all nuclear weapons tests.

With no progress in sight, the London talks were indefinitely suspended in September, 1957. Shortly afterward, Russian objections to the Western-oriented membership of the U.N. Subcommittee on Disarmament reached a peak. Although the United States and its allies agreed to bring the total membership of the Commission to 21, and the General Assembly agreed to increase membership to 25, Russia refused to participate further in disarmament talks. At the same time, a Russian offensive in nuclear weapons research was well under way. Not long after they tested an intercontinental ballistic missile, the Russians launched their first Sputnik.

In the months that followed, the United States and the Soviet Union were preoccupied with the race for earth satellites and perhaps for control of outer space; each was also concerned with creating favorable world opinion. After the conclusion of a series of Soviet nuclear tests, in March, 1958, the Soviet Union announced a unilateral ban on nuclear testing, effective as long as the other powers refrained from similar tests. This startling offer heightened public demand for an end to nuclear testing because of the unknown radiation hazard for present and future generations; it was publicized when public distaste for testing had reached a peak and was generally regarded in the United States as a propa-

(Continued on page 43)

Received At Our Desk

Russian Books . . .

SMOLENSK UNDER SOVIET RULE. By Merle Fainsod. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. 484 pages, bibliographical note, notes, glossary, index, \$8.50.)

The Smolensk Archive is a unique documentary history of Soviet rule in that ancient fortress city. The Archive was taken by the Germans during the invasion of Russia in World War II and later passed into American possession. Covering the years 1917-1938, the Archive provides a record of the formative period following the Bolshevik Revolution and Stalin's consolidation of power.

The book studies in detail the party and governmental structure, the way in which party and governmental regulations were enforced and administered, and how such regulations operated on the populace in this area. This Rand Corporation Research Study project reveals the people's dissatisfaction and discontent with Stalinist rule, a legacy with which Soviet rulers today must reckon. In this respect the author gives excellent background to the "grass roots" influence in Soviet politics. He translates Russian rule in Smolensk in terms of broader Soviet policies.

* * *

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET BUDGETARY SYSTEM. By R. W. DAVIES. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1958. 373 pages, tables, diagrams, bibliography, and index, \$8.50.)

Budgetary policy is an important consideration in understanding how a backward agricultural country, as Russia was in 1917, could so quickly develop into a modern industrial one. Yet until recently very little work has been done on Soviet financial and budgetary policy. Mr. Davies' excellent study has now appeared in response to this need. Coherently argued, thorough, and well-documented, this study evaluates the role budgetary policy played in Russian economic de-

velopment from 1917 to 1941, and examines how it operated. Mr. Davies' use of an historical approach further enhances the value of this work. It illuminates the shifts in budgetary policy and their causes by rooting these considerations in Russian economic history. He concludes by offering some tentative judgments on what in the Soviet budgetary system is peculiar to pre-war indigenous conditions and what might be generally relevant to all planned economies.

HERMAN LEBOVICS, Yale University.

THE DECEMBRISTS. By MIKHAIL ZETLIN. Translated from the Russian by George Panin. (New York: International Universities Press, 1958. 349 pages, with appendix of illustrations, \$5.00.)

In December of 1825 a group of "men of the world and gentlemen" staged the abortive revolution against Russian autocracy which has come to be known as the Decembrist Revolution or "the first Russian revolution."

Mikhail Zetlin's 1933 work on the Decembrists has now appeared in a posthumous English edition. It traces the movement from its inception in the ideologies revealed to young Russian officers as a result of their participation in the Napoleonic Wars to the death in 1845 of the last Decembrist conspirator who remained loyal to the ideals of the group.

What had been successful 30 years before in France was then still too early for Russia. The author concludes that the affair was more in the order of a palace coup than a revolution.

The specialist in Russian history will find Mr. Zetlin's work somewhat limited in usefulness; it lacks documentation and an index. It seems, however, to be based on extensive examination of documentary materials and makes fascinating reading. This balanced literate account challenges the Soviet view of the Decembrist event as a precursor of twentieth century revolution in Russia.

H. L.

RUSSIAN LIBERALISM. From Gentry to Intelligentsia. By GEORGE FISCHER. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. 204 pages, bibliography, notes, illustrations and index, \$4.50.)

This book gives an account of Russian liberalism in its swing from right to left. From the aristocratic political philosophy of the gentry, Russian liberalism devolved into a lower intelligentsia movement. The men and events that shaped Russian liberalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are given a new dimension by Mr. Fischer's analysis. The growth of Russian liberalism from its narrow beginnings with the gentry to its adoption by a new, middle class and militant intelligentsia presents an interesting history of

pre-Bolshevik Russia. In the twentieth century, the rather nebulous political ideals of the nineteenth century gentry crystallized into "a large liberal movement, with its own organization, program, press."

However, twentieth century liberalism was unable to solve the problem that was its legacy: to "find a third choice between conciliating autocracy and embracing revolution." In many respects, Russian liberalism remained unchanged, the principal difference was that the gradualism, the "small deeds" of the gentry, were replaced by the "senseless dreams" of twentieth century liberals. Mr. Fischer has made a worthwhile contribution to the study of Russian history.

(Continued from page 41)

ganda move to embarrass the United States when its own nuclear test series was about to begin. The United States refused to cancel its scheduled tests for the summer of 1958 and maintained that a test ban would be impossible to monitor.

In April the Soviet Union protested flights of armed American planes across the arctic toward the Soviet Frontier. But when the United States offered to set up an international Arctic inspection zone, the Soviet Union refused.

Conferring at Geneva in the summer of 1958, Russian and Western scientists agreed that a world detection system could be set up to monitor a nuclear test ban. Once the United States and British tests were completed the United States and Britain offered to stop nuclear testing for one year, starting October 31. This was the date for another disarmament conference. Although the Soviet Union continued to ask for a nuclear test ban "immediately" and "forever," the United States said it would stop testing for one year anyway.

The Deadlock Continues

Early in November, Western sources reported that Russian tests had been resumed. Thus the seesaw between nuclear weapons

research and nuclear test bans continued, with the U.S.S.R. and the United States each utilizing pauses between tests to pose as the "most peace-loving nation."

Unfortunately, the 15-year old deadlock over disarmament cannot be broken while the Soviet Union and the United States continue to pursue conflicting goals. Fearful of the horrifying nuclear potential of the United States and the striking power of SAC and American overseas arsenals, the Soviet Union will not abandon her demand for liquidation of American overseas bases, neutralization of Central Europe (the Rapacki Plan)⁸ and a permanent ban on nuclear tests. Equally fearful of the manpower potential of the U.S.S.R. and Red China, the United States will not surrender any opportunity to recover her nuclear weapons lead.

Each of these policies is coherent in terms of the current foreign policy and the short-range military security of the nation. Neither makes sense in view of the terrible potential for destruction foreshadowed by the nuclear arms race. The lesson of 15 years of fruitless negotiation is writ for all to read: political settlements in Europe, the Middle East and China must preface meaningful disarmament.

⁸ See Michael Florinsky's article in this issue, pages 1 ff.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FIFTH FRENCH REPUBLIC

On September 28, 1958, in a referendum in France and her territories, the French people voted overwhelmingly, by four to one, to accept the new constitution of Premier Charles de Gaulle, who was voted into office last June 1 to terminate a government crisis and to effect an Algerian peace with honor. The translation of the full text of this charter follows:

PREAMBLE

The French people solemnly proclaims its attachment to the rights of man and to principles of national sovereignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789, confirmed and perfected by the preamble of the Constitution of 1946.

By virtue of these principles and that of the free determination of peoples, the Republic offers to the overseas territories that manifest their desire to adhere to them new institutions founded on the common ideal of liberty, equality and fraternity and conceived with a view to their democratic evolution.

ARTICLE 1—The Republic and the peoples of the overseas territories who, by an act of free determination, adopt the present Constitution institute a Community.

The Community is founded on the equality and the solidarity of the peoples composing it.

TITLE I

On Sovereignty

ARTICLE 2—France is an indivisible, lay, democratic and social Republic. It assures the equality before the law of all citizens without distinction of origin, race or religion. It respects all beliefs.

The national emblem is the Tricolor Flag, blue, white and red.

The National Anthem is the "Marseillaise."

The motto of the Republic is "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity."

Its principle is government of the people, by the people and for the people.

ARTICLE 3—National sovereignty belongs to the people, which exercises it by its representatives and by its referendum.

No part of the people nor any individual can attribute to himself the exercise of sovereignty.

Suffrage may be direct or indirect under conditions provided for by the Constitution. It is always universal, equal and secret.

All French citizens of both sexes who have reached their majority and who possess

their civil and political rights are electors under conditions determined by law.

ARTICLE 4—Political parties and groups compete for suffrage. They form and exercise their activities freely. They must respect the principles of national sovereignty and of democracy.

TITLE II

The President of the Republic

ARTICLE 5—The President of the Republic sees to the respect of the Constitution. He assures, by his arbitration, the regular functioning of public powers, as well as the continuity of the state.

He is the guarantor of national independence, of the integrity of the territory, of the respect for community accords and for treaties.

ARTICLE 6—The President of the Republic is elected for seven years by an electoral college comprising the members of Parliament, of the General Councils and of the Assemblies of the overseas territories as well as the elected representatives of the municipal councils.

These representatives shall be:

The mayor for communes with less than 1,000 inhabitants; the mayor and first deputy for communes of from 1,000 to 2,000 inhabitants; the mayor, first deputy mayor and a municipal councilor chosen according to the order in which he appears on council list for communes of from 2,001 to 2,500 in-

habitants; the mayor and first two deputy mayors for communes of from 2,501 to 3,000 inhabitants; the mayor, the first two deputy mayors and three municipal councilors chosen according to the order in which they appear on council list for communes of from 3,001 to 6,000 inhabitants; the mayor, the first two deputy mayors and six municipal councilors chosen according to the order in which they appear on council list for communes of from 6,001 to 9,000 inhabitants; all municipal councilors for communes of more than 9,000 inhabitants; in addition, for communes of more than 30,000 inhabitants, delegates designated by the municipal council amounting to one delegate for every 1,000 inhabitants above 30,000.

In the overseas territories of the Republic the elected representatives of the councils of the administrative units also participate in the electoral college under conditions to be determined by an organic law.

The participation of member states of the community in the electoral college of the President of the Republic is set by agreement between the Republic and the member states of the community.

The mode of application of the present article will be set by an organic law.

ARTICLE 7—The President of the Republic is elected by an absolute majority on the first ballot. If this is not obtained, the President of the Republic is elected on a second ballot by a relative majority.

The voting is opened by convocation of the Government.

The election of the new President takes place twenty days at least and fifty days at most before the expiration of the powers of the President in office.

In case the Presidency of the Republic is vacated, for whatever cause, or impeded in its functioning as declared by the Constitutional Council, to which the matter has been referred by the Government and which decides by an absolute majority of its members, the functions of the President of the Republic, with the exception of those provided for by Articles 11 and 12 below, are exercised by the President of the Senate. In case of vacancy or when the impediment is declared definitive by the Constitutional Council, the voting for the election of the

new President takes place, except in cases of absolute necessity noted by the Constitutional Council, twenty days at least and fifty days at most after the opening of the vacancy or the declaration of the definitive character of the impediment.

ARTICLE 8—The President of the Republic names the Premier [Premier Ministre]. He puts an end to his functions upon the latter's presentation of the Government's resignation.

On the proposal of the premier, he names the other members of the Government and puts an end to their functions.

ARTICLE 9—The President of the Republic presides over the Council of Ministers [Cabinet].

ARTICLE 10—The President of the Republic promulgates laws within fifteen days following the transmission to the Government of the finally adopted law.

He may, before the expiration of this time, ask parliament for a new reading of the law or certain of its articles. This new reading cannot be refused.

ARTICLE 11—The President of the Republic, on the proposal of the Government during [Parliamentary] sessions or on joint proposal of the two assemblies, published in the Official Journal, may submit to a referendum any bill dealing with the organization of public powers, comprising approbation of a community agreement, or providing for authorization to ratify a treaty that, without being contrary to the Constitution, might affect the functioning of institutions.

When the referendum conclusion favors adoption of the bill, the President of the Republic promulgates it in the time stipulated in the preceding article.

ARTICLE 12—The President of the Republic may, after consulting the premier and the presidents of the assemblies, declare the dissolution of the National Assembly.

General elections take place twenty days at least and forty days at most after the dissolution.

The National Assembly meets by right the second Thursday following its election. If this meeting takes place outside the periods

of ordinary sessions, a session is rightfully opened for fifteen days.

A new dissolution cannot be effected within the year following these elections.

ARTICLE 13—The President of the Republic signs the ordinances and decrees deliberated upon in the Cabinet.

He names persons for the civil and military posts of the state.

Councilors of state, the grand chancellor of the Legion of Honor, ambassadors and extraordinary envoys, councilors of the Court of Accounts, prefects, representatives of the Government in the overseas territories, general officers, rectors of academies and directors of central administrations are named in meetings of the Cabinet.

An organic law will determine the other posts to be filled in meetings of the Cabinet as well as the conditions under which the nominating power of the President of the Republic may be delegated by him or exercised in his name.

ARTICLE 14—The President of the Republic accredits Ambassadors and extraordinary envoys to foreign powers: foreign Ambassadors and extraordinary envoys are accredited to him.

ARTICLE 15—The President of the Republic is the chief of the armies. He presides over the higher councils and committees of national defense.

ARTICLE 16—When the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the nation, the integrity of its territory or the execution of its international commitments are threatened in a grave and immediate manner and the regular functioning of the public powers is interrupted, the President of the Republic takes the measures required by these circumstances after official consultation with the Premier and the presidents of the assemblies as well as with the Constitutional Council.

He informs the nation of these measures by a message.

These measures must be inspired by the desire to assure to the constitutional public powers, in the shortest time, the means of fulfilling their functions. The Constitutional Council is consulted on them [the measures].

Parliament meets by right.

The National Assembly cannot be dissolved during the exercise of the exceptional powers.

ARTICLE 17—The President of the Republic has the right of pardon.

ARTICLE 18—The President of the Republic communicates with the two assemblies of Parliament by messages which he has read and which are not debated.

Outside of sessions, the Parliament is brought together especially for this purpose.

ARTICLE 19—The acts of the President of the Republic other than those provided for under Articles 8, 11, 12, 16, 18, 54, 56 and 61 are countersigned by the Premier and, should the occasion arise, by the appropriate ministers.

TITLE III The Government

ARTICLE 20—The Government determines and carries out the policies of the nation.

It has at its disposal the administration and the armed forces.

It is responsible to the Parliament under the conditions and according to the procedures provided for in Articles 49 and 50.

ARTICLE 21—The Premier directs the Government. He is responsible for national defense. He ensures the execution of the laws. Subject to the conditions of Article 13, he exercises regulatory powers and makes civil and military appointments.

He may delegate certain of his powers to the ministers.

He replaces, should the case arise, the President of the Republic as the president of the councils and committees provided under Article 15.

He may, in exceptional instances, replace him as the president of a Cabinet meeting by virtue of an explicit assignment and for a specific agenda.

ARTICLE 22—The acts of the Premier are countersigned, should the case arise, by the ministers responsible for their execution.

ARTICLE 23—The activities of members of the government are incompatible with the exercise of any parliamentary mandate, with the holding of any office at the national level

in business, professional or labor organizations, and with any public employment or professional activity.

An organic law determines the conditions for the replacement of the holders of such mandates, activities or employments.

The replacement of the members of parliament takes place in conformity with the provisions of Article 25.

TITLE IV

The Parliament

ARTICLE 24—The Parliament comprises the National Assembly and the Senate.

The deputies on the National Assembly are elected by direct suffrage.

The Senate is elected by indirect suffrage. It ensures the representation of the territorial groupings of the Republic. Frenchmen living outside France are represented in the Senate.

ARTICLE 25—An organic law determines the duration of the powers of each Assembly, the number of its members, their pay, the conditions of eligibility and ineligibility and the offices incompatible with membership in the Assemblies.

It determines as well the conditions under which are elected those persons called as replacements to fill the vacant seats of Deputies and Senators until the complete or partial renewal of the Assembly to which they belong.

ARTICLE 26—No member of Parliament may be pursued, sought out, arrested, detained or tried because of the opinions or votes expressed by him in the exercise of his functions.

No member of Parliament may be, during parliamentary sessions, prosecuted or arrested for criminal or minor offenses without the authorization of the Assembly of which he is a member except in the case of flagrant violations.

When Parliament is not in session, no member of Parliament can be arrested without the authorization of the Steering Committee of the Assembly of which he is a member, except for cases of flagrant violations, authorized prosecution or final conviction.

The detention or prosecution of a member of Parliament is suspended if the Assembly of which he is a member demands it.

ARTICLE 27—All categorical mandates are null and void.

The voting rights of the members of Parliament are personal.

The organic law may, under exceptional circumstances, authorize the delegation of a vote. In this case, no person can be delegated more than one vote.

ARTICLE 28—Parliament meets by right in two sessions a year.

The first session begins on the first Tuesday of October and ends on the third Friday of December.

The second session opens on the last Tuesday of April; its length may not exceed three months.

ARTICLE 29—Parliament meets in extraordinary session at the request of the Premier or of the majority of the members who make up the National Assembly, on a specific agenda.

When the extraordinary session is held on the request of the members of the National Assembly, the decree of closure is invoked as soon as the Parliament has exhausted the agenda for which it was called and at the latest twelve days from the date of its convocation.

Only the Premier may ask for a new session before the end of the month which follows the decree of closure.

ARTICLE 30—Outside of cases in which the Parliament meets by right, extraordinary sessions are opened and closed by decree of the President of the Republic.

ARTICLE 31—The members of the Government have access to the two assemblies. They are heard at their request.

They may be assisted by the commissioners of the Government.

ARTICLE 32—The Speaker of the National Assembly is elected for the duration of the legislature. The President of the Senate is elected after each partial re-election [of the Senate].

ARTICLE 33—The meetings of the two assemblies are public. The complete report of the debates is published in the Official Journal.

TITLE V

Parliament and Government Relations

ARTICLE 34—The law is voted by Parliament.

The law determines the rules concerning:

Civil rights and fundamental guarantees accorded to the citizens for the exercise of public liberties; the obligations imposed by the national defense upon the persons and property of the citizens;

The nationality, status and legal capacity of persons, marriage contracts, inheritances and gifts;

The determination of crimes and offenses as well as the punishments applicable to them; penal procedure; amnesty; the creation of new juridical systems and the statute of magistrates;

The basis, the rate and the methods of taxation of all types; the system of issuing money.

The law determines also the rules concerning:

The electoral system of the parliamentary assemblies and the local assemblies;

The establishment of categories of public institutions;

The fundamental guarantees accorded to civil and military employes of the state;

The nationalization of enterprises and the transfers of property from the public to the private sector.

The law determines the fundamental principles of:

The general organization of the national defense;

The free administration of local communities, of their powers and their resources;

Education;

The status of property, real estate laws and civil and commercial obligations;

Laws pertaining to employment, unions and social security.

The financial laws determine the financial resources and obligations of the state under the conditions and with the exceptions provided for by an organic law.

A program of laws determines the objectives of the economic and social activities of the state.

The provisions of the present articles will be detailed and completed by an organic law.

ARTICLE 35—The declaration of war is authorized by Parliament.

ARTICLE 36—Martial law is decreed by the cabinet. Its extension beyond twelve days can only be authorized by Parliament.

ARTICLE 37—All matters other than those which are in the domain of the law have a regulatory decree character.

Legislative texts pertaining to these matters may be modified by decrees taken after an opinion has been given by the Council of State. Those texts which come into being after the entry-into-force of the present Constitution will only be modified by decree if the Constitutional Council has stated that they have a regulatory character as defined by the preceding paragraph.

ARTICLE 38—The Government may, in the execution of its program, ask Parliament to authorize it to take through ordinances, during a limited period, measures which are normally in the domain of the law.

The ordinances are taken by the Cabinet after an opinion has been given by the Council of States. They come into force upon their publication but become null and void if a bill for ratification is not submitted to Parliament before the date fixed by the enabling act.

At the expiration of the period mentioned in the first paragraph of the present article, the ordinances may only be modified by the law in those matters which are in the legislative domain.

ARTICLE 39—Laws may be initiated by the Premier and by the members of Parliament.

Bills are discussed by the Cabinet after an opinion has been furnished by the Council of State and given in to the Steering Committee of one of the two assemblies. Motions having to do with finance are first submitted to the National Assembly.

ARTICLE 40—The bills and amendments formulated by the members of Parliament are not receivable when their adoption would have as a consequence either a diminution of public [financial] resources or the creation or increase of public expenditures.

ARTICLE 41—If it appears in the course of the legislative procedure that a bill or an amendment is not in the domain of the law or is contrary to a delegation [of authority] accorded by virtue of Article 38, the Government can declare its unadmissibility.

In case of a disagreement between the Government and the president of the interested assembly, the Constitutional Council,

at the request of the one or the other, rules within a time limit of eight days.

ARTICLE 42—The discussion of bills pertains, in the first assembly to which they have been referred, to the text presented by the Government.

An assembly given a text voted by the other assembly deliberates on the text which is transmitted to it.

ARTICLE 43—The bills are, at the request of the Government or of the assembly concerned with them, sent for study to committees specially designated for this purpose.

The bills for which such a request has not been made are sent to one of the permanent committees of which the number is limited to six in each assembly.

ARTICLE 44—Members of Parliament and of the Government have the right of amendment.

After the opening of the debate, the Government can oppose the consideration of any amendment which has not been submitted previously to the committee.

If the Government requests it, the Assembly concerned decides by a single vote on all or part of the text under discussion, considering only the amendments proposed or accepted by the Government.

ARTICLE 45—Every project or proposal of law is examined successively in the two Assemblies of Parliament with a view to the adoption of an identical text.

When, as a result of a disagreement between the two Assemblies, a bill has not been able to be adopted after two readings by each Assembly or, if the Government has declared it is urgent, after a single reading by each of them, the Premier has the right to bring about the meeting of a joint committee with the task of proposing a text on the matters still under discussion.

The text elaborated by the joint committee can be submitted by the Government for approval of the two Assemblies. No amendment is admissible except by agreement with the Government.

If the joint committee does not arrive at the adoption of a common text or if this text is not adopted under the conditions set forth in the preceding paragraph, the Government can, after a new reading by the National Assembly and by the Senate, re-

quest the National Assembly to rule definitively. In this case, the National Assembly can reconsider either the text elaborated by the joint committee, or the last text voted by the National Assembly, modified, when circumstances so require, by one or several of the amendments adopted by the Senate.

ARTICLE 46—The laws to which the Constitution confers the character of organic laws are voted and modified under the following conditions:

The bill is submitted to the deliberation and to the vote of the first assembly notified, only at the expiration of a period of fifteen days after its introduction.

The procedure of Article 45 is applicable. However, lacking an agreement between the two assemblies, the text can be adopted by the National Assembly on final reading only by an absolute majority of its members.

The organic laws relative to the Senate must be voted in the same manner by the two assemblies.

The organic laws can be promulgated only after a declaration by the Constitutional Council on their conformity to the Constitution.

ARTICLE 47—The Parliament votes finance bills under conditions to be set forth by an organic law.

If the National Assembly has not decided on a first reading in a period of forty days after the introduction of a bill, the Government refers it to the Senate, which must rule in a period of fifteen days. Procedure then takes place under the conditions set forth by Article 45.

If Parliament has not decided in a period of seventy days, the dispositions of the bill can be put into effect by ordinance.

If the finance bill fixing the resources and the expenses of a fiscal year has not been introduced soon enough for it to be promulgated before the beginning of that fiscal year, the Government shall request from Parliament the authorization to collect the taxes and to make available the credits needed for the activities voted.

The periods set forth in the present article are suspended when the Parliament is not in session.

The Court of Accounts assists the Parliament and the Government in the control of the execution of the finance laws.

ARTICLE 48—The agenda of the assemblies calls for, by priority and in the order that the Government has set, the discussing of the bills introduced by the Government and of the bills emanating from Parliament that are accepted by it.

One session a week is reserved by priority for the questions of members of the Parliament and to answers by the Government.

ARTICLE 49—The Premier, after deliberation by the Cabinet, stakes the existence of the Government before the National Assembly on its program or if [the] case arises on a declaration of its general policy.

The National Assembly brings into question the existence of the Government by the vote of a motion of censure. Such a motion is receivable only if it is signed by at least one-tenth of the members of the National Assembly. The vote can take place only forty-eight hours after the motion has been put in.

The only votes counted are those favorable to a motion of censure, which can be adopted only by a majority of the members composing the assembly. If the motion of censure is rejected, its signers cannot propose a new one in the course of the same session, except in the case set forth in the paragraph that follows.

The Premier can, after deliberation by the Cabinet, stake the existence of the Government before the National Assembly on the vote of a text. In this case, this text is considered as adopted, unless a motion of censure, put in during the twenty-four hours which follow, is voted in the conditions set forth in the preceding paragraph.

The Premier has the right to ask the Senate for approval of a declaration of general policy.

ARTICLE 50—When the National Assembly adopts a motion of censure or when it disapproves the program or a declaration of general policy of the Government, the Premier must give the President of the Republic the resignation of the Government.

ARTICLE 51—The closing of ordinary or extraordinary sessions is by right delayed in order to permit, should the case arise, application of the provisions of Article 49.

TITLE VI

Treaties and International Agreements

ARTICLE 52—The President of the Republic negotiates and ratifies treaties.

He is informed of all negotiations leading to the conclusion of an international accord not subject to ratification.

ARTICLE 53—Peace treaties, commercial treaties, treaties or agreements relative to international organization, those that involve the finances of the state, those that modify dispositions of a legislative nature, those relative to the status of persons, those which bear on the cession, exchange or addition of territory, can be ratified or approved only by a law.

They go into effect only after having been ratified or approved.

No cession, no exchange, no addition of territory is valid without the consent of the populations concerned.

ARTICLE 54—If the Constitutional Council, the matter having been referred to it by the President of the Republic, by the Premier or by the President of one or the other Assembly, has declared that an international commitment contains a clause contrary to the Constitution, the authorization to ratify it or to approve it can take place only after the revision of the Constitution.

ARTICLE 55—Treaties or accords normally ratified or approved have, upon their publication, an authority superior to that of laws, under the condition, for each agreement or treaty, of its application by the other party.

TITLE VII

The Constitutional Council

ARTICLE 56—The Constitutional Council consists of nine members, whose terms last nine years and are not renewable. One-third of the membership of the Constitutional Council will be renewed every three years. Three of its members are named by the President of the Republic, three by the president of the National Assembly, three by the president of the Senate.

In addition to the nine members provided for above, former Presidents of the Republic are members ex officio for life of the Constitutional Council.

The President is named by the President of the Republic. He has the deciding vote in case of a tie.

ARTICLE 57—The duties of a member of the Constitutional Council are incompatible with those of a minister or a member of parliament. The other points of incompatibility will be fixed by an organic law.

ARTICLE 58—The Constitutional Council supervises the election of the President of the Republic.

It studies complaints and announces the results of the vote.

ARTICLE 59—The Constitutional Council rules, in the case of a disagreement, on the regularity of the election of deputies and senators.

ARTICLE 60—The Constitutional Council supervises the operations of a referendum and announces the results.

ARTICLE 61—Organic laws, before their promulgation, and regulations of the parliamentary assemblies, before they come into application, must be submitted to the Constitutional Council, which decides on their conformity to the Constitution.

To the same ends, laws may be referred to the Constitutional Council, before their promulgation, by the President of the Republic, the Premier or the president of one or the other of the assemblies.

In the cases provided for by the two preceding paragraphs, the Constitutional Council must make its ruling within a period of one month. However, at the request of the Government because of urgency, this period is reduced to eight days.

In these same cases, referral to the Constitutional Council suspends the time-limit for promulgation.

ARTICLE 62—A provision declared unconstitutional may not be promulgated or put in force.

The decisions of the Constitutional Council cannot be appealed. They must be recognized by the public powers and by all administrative and juridical authorities.

ARTICLE 63—An organic law determines the rules of organization and functioning of the Constitutional Council, the procedure which is followed by it, and particularly the period during which a dispute may be laid before it.

TITLE VIII

Judicial Authority

ARTICLE 64—The President of the Republic is the guarantor of judicial independence and authority.

He is assisted by the High Council of the Magistrateship.

An organic law is superior to magistrates.

Magistrates hold office for life.

ARTICLE 65—The High Council of the Magistrateship is presided over by the President of the Republic. Its Vice President is the Minister of Justice *ex officio*. He may replace the President of the Republic.

Furthermore, the High Council includes nine members designated by the President of the Republic in conformity with conditions to be established by an organic law.

The High Council of the Magistrateship presents nominations for magistrates sitting in Court of Cassation [Supreme Court of Appeal] and for the presiding judge of the Court of Appeals. It gives its opinion under the provisions to be set forth by an organic law on proposals of the Minister of Justice relative to the nominations of the other magistrates.

It is consulted on questions of pardon under conditions to be set forth by an organic law.

The High Council of the Magistrateship may rule as a disciplinary council. In such cases it is presided over by the presiding judge of the Court of Cassation.

ARTICLE 66—No one may be arbitrarily detained.

The judicial authority, guardian of individual liberty, assures the respect of this principle under conditions provided for by law.

TITLE IX

The High Justice Court

ARTICLE 67—There is established a High Justice Court.

It is composed of members of Parliament elected in equal number by the National Assembly and by the Senate after each complete or partial election to these assemblies. It elects its presiding judge from among its members.

An organic law shall fix the composition of the High Court, its rules and the procedure applicable before it.

ARTICLE 68—The President of the Republic is accountable for the acts undertaken in the exercise of his duties only in the case of high treason. He can be indicted only by the two assemblies ruling by identical vote in open balloting and by an absolute majority of the members composing them [the two assemblies]. He is judged by the High Court of Justice.

The members of the government can be brought to trial for acts undertaken in the exercise of their duties and considered as crimes or offenses at the moment they are committed.

The procedure defined above is applicable to them as well as to their accomplices in the case of a plot against the security of the state. In the cases set forth in the present paragraph, the High Court is bound by the definition of the crimes and offenses as well as by the determination of the penalties such as they result from the penal laws in force at the moment when the deeds [crimes] were committed.

TITLE X

The Economic and Social Council

ARTICLE 69—The Economic and Social Council, when called on by the government, gives its opinion on the bills, ordinances or decrees which have been put before it.

A member of the Economic and Social Council may be designated by the latter to present, before the parliamentary assemblies, the opinion of the Council on the government or parliamentary bills that have been submitted to it.

ARTICLE 70—The Economic and Social Council can likewise be consulted by the Government on any problem of an economic or social character of interest to the Republic or to the community. Any economic or social plan or bill is submitted to it for advice.

ARTICLE 71—The composition of the Economic and Social Council and its operating rules shall be set by an organic law.

TITLE XI

Territorial Collectivities

ARTICLE 72—The territorial collectivities of the Republic are communes, departments, and overseas territories. Any other territorial collectivity is created by law.

These collectivities administer themselves freely through elected councils and under the conditions provided for by law.

In the departments and the territories, the delegate of the government is charged with national interests, administrative control and respect for the laws.

ARTICLE 73—The legislative system and administrative organization of the overseas departments may be the subject of measures of adjustment required by their particular situation.

ARTICLE 74—The overseas territories of the Republic have a special organization taking account of their particular interests within the general total interests of the Republic. This organization is defined and modified by law after consultation with the territorial assembly concerned.

ARTICLE 75—Citizens of the Republic who do not have ordinary civil status, the only status considered in Article 34, keep their personal status as long as they have not renounced it.

ARTICLE 76—The overseas territories may retain their status within the Republic.

If they express the will to do so by deliberation of their territorial assembly within the period fixed in the first paragraph of Article 91, they may become either overseas departments of the Republic or, grouped among themselves or as single units, member states of the community.

TITLE XII

The Community

ARTICLE 77—In the Community established by the present Constitution, the states enjoy autonomy; they administer themselves and manage their own affairs democratically and freely.

There is only one citizenship in the Community.

All citizens are equal before the law, whatever their origin, their race and their religion. They have the same duties.

ARTICLE 78—The field of competence of the Community includes foreign policy, defense, currency, common economic and financial policy, as well as policy on strategic raw materials.

It includes in addition, except for special agreement, control of justice, higher educa-

tion, general organization of external and Community transportation, and telecommunications.

Special agreements may establish other common fields of competence or regulate the transfer of competence from the Community to one of its members.

ARTICLE 79—The member states benefit from the dispositions of Article 77 as soon as they have exercised the choice provided for in Article 76.

Until the measures required for application of this title (12) go into effect, matters of common jurisdiction will be regulated by the Republic.

ARTICLE 80—The President of the Republic presides over and represents the Community.

The Community has an Executive Council, Senate and a Court of Arbitration as institutions.

ARTICLE 81—The member states of the Community participate in the election of the president according to the conditions set forth in Article 6.

The President of the Republic, in his capacity of President of the Community, is represented in each state of the Community.

ARTICLE 82—The President of the Community presides over the executive council of the Community. It consists of the Premier of the Republic, the chiefs of government of each of the member states, and the ministers responsible for the common affairs of the Community.

The Executive Council organizes the co-operation of members of the Community at government and administrative levels.

The organization and functions of the Executive Council will be fixed by an organic law.

ARTICLE 83—The Senate of the Community is composed of delegates whom the Parliament of the Republic and the legislative assemblies of the other members of the Community choose from their own membership. The number of delegates of each state is determined by its population and the responsibilities it assumes in the Community.

The Senate holds two sessions a year, which are opened and closed by the Presi-

dent of the Community and may not exceed one month each.

When called on by the President of the Community, the Senate deliberates on the common economic and financial policy before laws in these fields are voted by the Parliament of the Republic, or, as the case may be, by the legislative assemblies of the other members of the Community.

The Senate studies acts and treaties or international agreements specified in Articles 35 and 53 and which commit the Community.

The Senate passes binding measures in the fields in which it has received delegation of power from the legislative assemblies of the members of the Community. These measures are promulgated in the same form as the law of the territory of each of the states concerned.

An organic law will fix the Senate's composition and the rules for its functioning.

ARTICLE 84—A Community Court of Arbitration rules on disputes occurring among members of the Community.

Its composition and its competence will be fixed by an organic law.

ARTICLE 85—By derogation of the procedure set forth in Article 89, the dispositions of this title (XII) which concern the functioning of common institutions are amendable by identical laws voted by the parliament of the Republic and by the Senate of the Community.

ARTICLE 86—A change of status of a member state may be requested either by the Republic or by a resolution of the legislative assembly of the state concerned confirmed by a local referendum the organization and supervision of which are provided for by the institutions of the Community. The ways and means of this change are determined by an agreement approved by the Parliament of the Republic and the legislative assembly concerned.

Under the same conditions a member state of the Community may become independent. It ceases in consequence to belong to the Community.

ARTICLE 87—The particular agreements made for the application of this Title XII are approved by the Parliament of the Republic and the legislative assembly concerned.

TITLE XIII**Agreements of Association**

ARTICLE 88—The Republic or the Community may make agreements with states that wish to associate themselves with the Republic or the Community to develop their civilizations.

TITLE XIV**Revision**

ARTICLE 89—The initiative for amending the Constitution belongs concurrently to the President of the Republic on the proposal of the Premier and to the members of Parliament.

The bill for amendment must be voted by the two Assemblies in identical terms. The amendment is definitive after approval by referendum.

However, the projected amendment is not submitted to a referendum when the President of the Republic decides to submit it to the parliament convoked in congress; in this case, the projected amendment is approved only if it is accepted by a majority of three-fifths of the votes cast. The Steering Committee of the congress is that of the National Assembly.

No amendment procedure may be undertaken or followed if it is prejudicial to the integrity of the territory.

The republican form of government is not subject to revision.

TITLE XV**Temporary Dispositions**

ARTICLE 90—The ordinary session of parliament is suspended. The mandate of the members of the present National Assembly will expire the day the assembly elected under the present Constitution meets.

Until this meeting, the government alone has the authority to convoke parliament.

The mandate of the members of the Assembly of the French Union will expire at the same time as the mandate of the members of the present National Assembly.

ARTICLE 91—The Institutions of the Republic set forth by the present Constitution shall be set up within four months after its promulgation.

This period is extended to six months for the institutions of the Community.

The powers of the present President of the Republic will expire only when the results of the election provided for in Articles 6 and 7 of the present [this] Constitution are proclaimed.

The member states of the Community will participate in this first election under the conditions derived from their status at the date of the promulgation of the Constitution.

The established authorities will continue in the exercise of their functions in these states according to the laws and regulations applicable when the Constitution goes into force until the establishment of the authorities provided for by their new regime.

Until its definitive composition, the Senate shall consist of the present members of the advisory Council of the Republic. The organic laws that will determine the definitive composition of the Senate must be passed before July 31, 1959.

The powers conferred on the Constitutional Council by Articles 58 and 59 of the Constitution shall be exercised, until the establishment of the council, by a committee composed of the vice president of the Council of State, the presiding judge of the Court of Cassation and the presiding judge of the Court of Accounts.

The peoples of the member states of the Community shall continue to be represented in Parliament until the measures necessary to the application of Title XII go into effect.

ARTICLE 92—The legislative measures necessary to the establishment of the institutions and, until they are established, to the functioning of the public powers, will be taken by the Cabinet, on the advice of the Council of State, in [the] form of ordinances having the force of law.

During the period fixed in the first paragraph of Article 91 the Government is authorized to fix, by ordinances having the force of law and passed in the same way, the electoral system for the assemblies provided for by the Constitution.

During the same period and under the same conditions, the Government can also adopt measures in all domains which it may deem necessary to the life of the nation, the protection of citizens and the safeguarding of liberties.

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

Berlin Crisis

Nov. 10—Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev says that the 1945 Potsdam agreement providing for division of Berlin among the Four Powers is outmoded. The Soviet leader intends to turn the Russian sector of Berlin over to the East German government. The U.S., France and Britain are told that they will have to negotiate with East Germany on the question of access to Free Berlin. The three powers and West Germany do not recognize at present the East German government.

Nov. 12—The West German Cabinet threatens to discontinue diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union if Khrushchev abandons Four-Power control of Berlin.

Nov. 14—Soviet authorities halt 3 U.S. trucks and drivers in transit from West Germany to West Berlin when inspection of the vehicles is refused.

Nov. 16—Separate elections held in East Germany and East Berlin indicate that the Soviets have not yet handed East Berlin over to East German control. East Berliners vote for their city parliament, and do not participate in the election to the *Volkshammer* (East German Parliament).

Nov. 22—The British differ with the U.S., France and West Germany over the question of East German inspection of Allied transports to Berlin.

Nov. 26—U.S. Secretary Dulles hints that East German guards might be allowed to inspect Western supplies going to West Berlin. In no case, the Secretary declares, will blockading of the supply routes be permitted.

Nov. 27—Moscow demands that Berlin be made a free city, demilitarized and with its own government. If the Western powers refuse, Moscow plans to hand con-

trol of East Berlin over to East Germany in 6 months. The Soviet leaders promise to guarantee Berlin's road communications if West Berlin does not permit anti-Communist bloc activity within its borders.

West Berlin officials reject the Soviet proposal to demilitarize and free Berlin from occupation rule.

The U.S. State Department refuses to repudiate the Potsdam agreement.

Nov. 28—A Soviet spokesman says that the 6-month period for handing control of East Berlin over to East Germany possibly may be extended if negotiations on Berlin's status proceed smoothly.

Ambassadors from the U.S., France and Britain meet with West German officials in Bonn to discuss the Berlin question.

Nov. 30—Secretary Dulles suggests a meeting with the French and British foreign ministers for December to confer on the Soviet proposal for a demilitarized Berlin.

President Eisenhower assures West Berliners that no policy hostile to their freedom will be adopted.

Colombo Plan Meeting

Nov. 9—U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles leaves Washington to attend the Colombo plan conference in Seattle.

Nov. 10—President Eisenhower addresses the Colombo Plan conference and suggests a "great peaceful crusade" against hunger and disease.

Disarmament Negotiations

Nov. 3—In the second of a series of 3-power talks on nuclear disarmament, U.S. and British diplomats oppose Soviet negotiators on the question of an agenda.

Nov. 4—Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki proposes to eliminate atomic weapons in central Europe in two stages: first banning production of nuclear weapons and installations in Central European

countries and then including the West and the U.S.S.R. Meanwhile, an agreement would be reached on conventional disarmament in Central Europe.

Nov. 7—The U.S. says that the U.S.S.R. is continuing nuclear tests, and warns that the West may follow.

Nov. 8—The U.S. tells the U.S.S.R. that the coming conference on prevention of surprise attack must be limited to discussing technical methods of preventing surprise attack.

Authoritative sources say that the U.S.S.R. is prepared to allow Western inspectors inside its territory as part of international monitoring of a nuclear test ban.

Nov. 10—Disagreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is evidenced as the conference on preventing surprise attack opens.

Nov. 11—The Russians say that the conference on surprise attack must be linked to disarmament steps.

Nov. 12—The U.S.S.R. refuses to discuss a ban on intercontinental ballistic missiles or on military use of outer space unless the U.S. gives up foreign bases.

Nov. 13—In a working paper, the U.S. suggests a plan to end all nuclear testing.

Nov. 15—The U.S. refuses the latest Russian suggestion to end nuclear weapons tests permanently, without an international control system.

Nov. 17—The Russians propose a ban on aircraft armed with nuclear arms flying over other states or the high seas.

Nov. 18—The U.S. and Great Britain offer to discuss a test ban and a control system in two different agreements, to be considered concurrently. Up to now, the Western nations have insisted on a single treaty.

Nov. 24—The U.S. outlines a plan for guarding against surprise attack.

Nov. 27—The U.S.S.R. outlines a new proposal on nuclear test bans; the plan is kept secret at present.

Nov. 28—The U.S.S.R. suggests how to guard against surprise attacks; the plan includes neutralization of Germany, limited inspection and control in Central Europe, the Middle East and the Western U.S. and some limitation of arms and weapons.

Far East Crisis

Nov. 1—In the first interview given since the outbreak of hostilities in late August, Communist China's Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen Yi, tells a Canadian journalist that his government insists on "liberating" the offshore islands.

Nov. 3—In very heavy shelling, the Chinese Communists renew their attack on Quemoy.

Nov. 5—U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower declares that recognition of Communist China is impossible while Peking refuses to honor its promise to release all Americans it holds prisoner.

Nov. 9—The U.S. President assures the China Chapter of the Asian Peoples Anti-Communist League that the U.S. will not relinquish the offshore islands in the face of Communist Chinese aggression.

Nov. 14—Reports of Chinese Communist purges in Shantung and Liaoning provinces are disclosed.

Nov. 23—Communist shelling of the offshore islands totals some 1800 shells today.

Nov. 25—U.S. Polish Ambassador Jacob D. Beam and Chinese Polish Ambassador Wang Ping-Nan secretly confer in Warsaw on the Taiwan crisis.

Latin America

Nov. 17—Economic problems are discussed by the "Committee of Twenty-one" representing the Latin American states, in a conference in Washington, D.C.

Nov. 24—Delegates from 15 Latin American states meet in Rio de Janeiro to discuss regional payments plans as a preliminary to the establishment of a Latin American common market.

Nato

Nov. 3—General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, says that Nato forces are being converted to missile warfare as fast as possible.

United Nations

Nov. 3—Voting 49 to 9 in the General Assembly's Special Political Committee, members approve the continuing of the United Nations Emergency Force patrolling the Israeli-Egyptian border.

Voting 78 to 0, the Political Committee of the General Assembly approves a plan to broaden the Disarmament Commission in 1959 to include all U.N. members.

Nov. 5—The U.S. suggestion that a U.N. peace force be established is shelved in the General Assembly's Special Political Committee, after Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld says he sees no need to act on the suggestion at present.

Nov. 6—The U.S.S.R. says that its share of the U.N. budget is too large.

Nov. 11—After Jordanian King Hussein's plane is "buzzed" in flight over Syria, Jordan asks the Security Council to consider the unfriendly act. (See also *Jordan*.)

The U.N. General Assembly's Political Committee passes a resolution that Korea be unified on the basis of U.N. supervised elections, despite strong Soviet opposition to such a resolution.

Nov. 14—The General Assembly decides to continue temporarily to finance the U.N. Emergency Force patrolling the Egyptian-Syrian border.

The General Assembly again elects Dr. Auguste R. Lindt of Switzerland as U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

The General Assembly unanimously approves a resolution noting that France is to end its trusteeship over Togland when it becomes a Republic in 1960.

Nov. 18—The U.S.S.R. proposes that the U.N. should set up a preparatory commission to study the problem of international control of outer space. The Soviet Union waives its previous demand that the U.S. withdraw from foreign bases before international control can be discussed.

Nov. 19—U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld reveals a decision to liquidate the U.N. Observation Group in Lebanon.

Nov. 20—Povl Bang-Jensen asks the U.N. Administrative Tribunal to allow him to see the documents that led to his removal as a senior political officer of the U.N.

Nov. 24—The General Assembly's Political Committee supports an 18-nation Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space despite the possibility of a Russian boycott.

Nov. 27—Soviet bloc representatives say that there will be no revisions in the U.N. Charter until Communist China is admitted to the U.N.

West European Trade

Nov. 3—A special ministerial council representing the European Coal and Steel Community approves a \$7 million program of loans and grants for over-supplied coal mines.

Nov. 9—Nordic ministers and parliament members begin conferences on a Nordic common market and customs union.

Nov. 13—Four Nordic nations advise the European common market nations that economic warfare may follow a breakdown of the European common market.

Nov. 17—Negotiations on a European free trade area are suspended by the British chairman of the negotiating committee.

Nov. 18—It is reported in Paris that Premier Charles de Gaulle will try to compromise the difficulties that developed over a European free trade area. The split developed because of disagreement as to which states should be included in a free trade area. France demanded that no member should lower tariffs unless all other members of the free trade area authorize the action.

Nov. 26—French Premier Charles de Gaulle and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer agree to drop a project for a European free trade area and to study a looser "multilateral association" of states of the European Economic Community and their trading partners outside the Common market.

ARGENTINA

Nov. 11—Carrying out his threat to use force if necessary, President Arturo Frondizi calls out the military and proclaims a state of siege when oil workers refuse to return to their jobs. The strike has been called to protest the government's policy concerning oil contracts with foreign companies.

Nov. 12—Vice-President Alejandro Gomez is accused of fomenting an anti-government plot against President Frondizi. His resignation is demanded by the Radical Intransigent party, to which he and Frondizi belong.

Nov. 18—Vice-President Gomez resigns.

Nov. 29—President Frondizi calls on the Army to arrest some 1000 railroad workers who resisted his decree drafting them into the army. Earlier this week, the Argentine

government admitted that it did not have the money to pay railroad workers eight months' back pay.

BELGIUM

Nov. 4—The Social Christian (Roman Catholic) Cabinet under Premier Gaston Eyskens resigns.

Nov. 6—Eyskens forms a new cabinet, at the request of King Baudouin, composed of 12 Social Christians and 7 Liberals.

Nov. 10—Belgian Priest Rev. Dominique Georges Henri Pire, head of the Aid to Displaced Persons charitable organization, receives the Nobel Peace Prize.

BRAZIL

Nov. 18—President Juscelino Kubitschek freezes food prices on staple goods, bus and trolley fares, and public utility rates.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Australia

Nov. 22—With voting compulsory, more than five million persons vote to return Prime Minister Robert Gordon Menzies' Government to office. The Liberal-Country party coalition will serve its fourth successive term.

Canada

Nov. 5—B. G. McIntyre resigns as Controller of the Treasury after 18 years of service; H. R. Balls succeeds him.

Prime Minister John Diefenbaker arrives in Paris to talk to Premier Charles de Gaulle of France.

Ceylon

Nov. 4—Visiting Ceylon, West German Minister for the Economy Ludwig Erhard warns that excessive nationalism may isolate Ceylon.

Nov. 14—The U.S. and Ceylon sign an agreement under which the U.S. will give \$735,000 for agricultural development in Ceylon. Since 1956, the U.S. has given Ceylon \$30,450,000.

Ghana

Nov. 10—The Government arrests 43 members of the Opposition party charging

them with a plot to assassinate Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah and two other ministers. All the arrested persons belong to the Accra branch of the United party.

Nov. 11—Opposition United party spokesmen say the arrest of 43 of their members is an excuse for totalitarian rule.

Nov. 16—Kwame Nkrumah says he is going to serve as Minister of the Interior. He is already Minister of Defense. He explains that this action is taken "because of the present difficulties arising out of an organized conspiracy to destroy the Government. . . ."

Nov. 23—Ghana and Guinea reveal a provisional agreement to join in a "confederacy," designed to be "the nucleus of a union of West African states."

Great Britain

Nov. 4—The Government increases military pensions and allowances.

The Commons rejects a Labor effort at censuring the Government's economic policies. The vote is 324-255.

Nov. 11—Commons approves the Government's pension plan, voting 308 to 261.

India

Nov. 2—Meeting in New Delhi, ministers of the state governments decide to free Indian peasants as far as possible from state and central government controls.

Nov. 7—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru says that the "naked military dictatorship" of General Mohammed Ayub Khan in Pakistan adds to the danger of war between Pakistan and India.

Nov. 16—India and the U.S.S.R. sign a 5-year trade agreement in Moscow.

Nov. 28—Sheik Mohammed Abdullah agrees to hear himself arraigned for treason against Kashmir's pro-Indian government; Sheik Abdullah was formerly Prime Minister of Kashmir.

Pakistan

Nov. 2—Iskander Mirza, the former president of Pakistan, starts into exile.

Nov. 10—Foreign Minister Manzoor Qadir warns Israel that if she threatens Arab interests in the Middle East by a military offensive, it "would be a matter of grave concern" to Pakistan.

Nov. 16—President Mohammed Ayub Khan says that he is withdrawing all troops from martial-law duties and dissolving standing military courts at once.

BRITISH EMPIRE, THE

Central African Federation

Nov. 12—Almost 90,000 voters cast ballots for 59 members of the Federation's second Parliament.

Nov. 13—The United Federal party led by Prime Minister Roy Welensky wins a sweeping victory. The party, which favors independence within the Commonwealth, is assured of a two-thirds majority.

Cyprus

Nov. 1—The Greek Government says that Britain and Turkey caused the failure of talks on Cyprus under Nato auspices.

Nov. 8—Britain offers to arm British civilians in Cyprus as terrorism grows.

Nov. 14—Exiled Archbishop Makarios says Greece will ask the U.N. to try to establish an independent Cyprus.

Guiana

Nov. 5—A committee is appointed by Governor Sir Patrick Renison to draw up a new constitution.

BULGARIA

Nov. 13—The Bulgarian Embassy in Czechoslovakia states that Bulgaria will consolidate 3,200 cooperative farms into 1,000 larger units.

Nov. 27—President of the Presidium Major General Georgi Damyanov dies at the age of 66.

BURMA

Nov. 10—The government reveals that the average annual income in Burma for fiscal 1957-1958 was \$41.

CAMBODIA

Nov. 9—The fifth anniversary of Cambodia's independence from France is celebrated.

Nov. 25—Thailand closes its border with Cambodia, which requested a temporary suspension of diplomatic relations.

CHILE

Nov. 3—President Jorge Alessandri is inaugurated.

CHINA (See *International, Far East Crisis.*)

CUBA

Nov. 2—Seventeen persons are killed when rebels aboard an airliner force a crash landing over the north coast of Oriente Province.

Nov. 3—In general elections for President, Congress, provincial governors and local officers, Dr. Andres Rivero Aguero, running on a coalition 4-party ticket, takes a strong lead over his 3 opponents.

Nov. 4—Dr. Aguero's victory is announced. Returns on voting for other offices are not yet totaled.

Nov. 9—Rebel leaders declare a cease-fire for 30 hours in the area surrounding Santiago while they turn over to the International Red Cross the 25 passengers captured aboard a downed airliner.

DENMARK

Nov. 2—Communist party leader Aksel Larsen is superseded by Knud Jespersen after 26 years in office.

Nov. 15—Larsen is expelled from the Communist party of Denmark because of Titoist ideas.

FINLAND

Nov. 27—Five Agrarian party ministers resign from Premier Karl-August Fagerholm's coalition government.

FRANCE

Nov. 6—Premier Charles de Gaulle decorates British statesman Sir Winston Churchill with the Cross of Lorraine, admitting him to membership in the Order of the Liberation.

Nov. 14—The French Cabinet approves a law to allow for contracts with French and foreign companies for exploration and development of oil resources in the Sahara.

France and the Soviet Union agree to raise the level of trading for the period 1959-1962 to an average \$205 million annually.

Nov. 23—Frenchmen vote for 465 delegates to the National Assembly, who will compose the first parliament under the fifth French Republic.

Nov. 24—Only 42 of the 465 seats at stake are filled under the new law providing that a candidate must have an absolute majority of the votes cast. On November 30 run-off elections requiring only a plurality vote will be held to fill the remaining seats. The vote indicates tremendous support for Premier de Gaulle. The Union for the New Republic composed of pro-Gaullists campaigning for a stable center government in Parliament appears to be ahead.

Nov. 30—In run-off elections, French voters choose a 465-man National Assembly, exclusive of overseas delegates, with strong Gaullist and Right-wing tendencies. The Union for the New Republic, led by Minister of Information Jacques Soustelle and other de Gaulle supporters, captures the greatest number of seats, 188. The Independent Republicans, a second group ranging from moderate to right, take 132 seats to make them the second most influential group.

FRENCH OVERSEAS COMMUNITY

Algeria

Nov. 10—Algerian nationalists fail to present themselves as candidates in the forthcoming elections this month. No Muslim candidates had filed to run in the elections when the deadline for filing closed at midnight yesterday. The only candidates running express the views of the French Army and Committees of Public Safety.

Nov. 28—Voting begins in Algeria for the election of deputies to the French National Assembly.

Nov. 29—It is reported that the French leader in Algeria, General Raoul Salan, may be replaced.

Nov. 30—The Minister of Information for the Algerian Provisional Government, in a C.B.S. television broadcast from New York, declares that a mission from his government has left for Peking to negotiate an arms deal for Algerian nationalist rebels.

Voting ends with returns from the elections incomplete. Candidates of the Committees of Public Safety are leading.

Chad, Gabon, Mauritania, Middle Congo, Senegal and French Sudan

Nov. 24—The territorial assembly of French Sudan in French West Africa proclaims itself an autonomous republic within the French Community.

Nov. 25—The territorial assembly votes to make Senegal an independent republic within the new French Community.

Nov. 28—The territorial assemblies in Chad, Gabon and the Middle Congo in French Equatorial Africa and Mauritania in French West Africa vote to become autonomous republics in the French Overseas Community.

GERMANY (WEST)

Nov. 6—It is disclosed that months ago the Western European Union gave unanimous permission to West Germany to include in her military establishment a short range anti-tank rocket and a naval training ship, both of which violate the armaments restrictions of 1955 imposed on the Germans.

Nov. 11—West German Rear Admiral Heinrich Gerlach expects that German naval power will soon be helping Nato patrol the Atlantic.

Nov. 16—It is announced that the Ruhr steel companies have canceled coal imports from the U.S. valued at \$20 million and that henceforth domestic coal only will be used.

Nov. 24—It is announced that the U.S. will support reducing armament restrictions on West Germany at the December meeting of Nato.

GERMANY (EAST)

Nov. 16—Elections to the East German Parliament are held with only Communist candidates running on a single list.

HUNGARY

Nov. 16—Hungarians elect a single list of 338 Communist candidates.

IRAN

Nov. 22—The Shah of Iran offers to appoint the ruler of Bahrein governor general of this British protectorate if Bahrein would recognize Iranian sovereignty.

IRAQ

Nov. 4—The Baghdad radio declares that Colonel Abdel Salam Arif has been arrested for returning from Europe to Baghdad without permission. Colonel Arif was formerly second in command to Premier Abdel Karim el-Kassem, who engineered the July revolt against King Faisal.

Nov. 5—Events in Baghdad last week—rioting and the arrest of Colonel Arif—are reported to be part of a pro-Nasser coup which was foiled by Premier Kassem.

Nov. 10—A military tribunal orders death sentences in the trial of former Premier Fadhil al Jamali and two army generals.

Nov. 15—Iraq and the U.A.R. sign trade, economic and technical assistance agreements.

ISRAEL

Nov. 5—The U.S. agrees to sell Israel agricultural surplus products worth some \$37 million.

Nov. 17—Ambassador Abba Eban, speaking in the U.N. General Assembly Special Political Committee, states that compensation might be given to Arab refugees in Palestine without waiting for a general Arab-Israeli accord. Hitherto Israel has declared that a peace settlement must precede compensation.

ITALY

Nov. 20—The erection of the first nuclear power plant in Italy begins.

Nov. 24—The Constitutional High Court, Italy's final court, declares that any religious group may operate a church and conduct meetings without a police authorization.

JAPAN

Nov. 22—Premier Nobusuke Kishi drops the controversial bill to enlarge the police powers.

Nov. 27—The engagement of Crown Prince Akihito to a commoner, Michiko Shoda, is announced.

JORDAN (See also International, U.N. and U.A.R.)

Nov. 10—King Hussein flies back to Amman while en route to his European vacation. He claims that U.A.R. planes attacked him while flying over Syria.

The U.A.R. denies that its planes attacked Hussein.

LEBANON

Nov. 12—Parliament votes emergency powers to the government of Premier Rashid Karami, who is empowered to rule by decree for the next 6 months.

Nov. 14—Archbishop Theodoseos Abu Rjeil of Lebanon is elected Patriarch of Antioch and the Entire East by the Sacred College of Orthodox Archbishops. The oldest throne in Christianity commands fealty from Orthodox groups in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, part of Turkey, the U.S. and Latin America.

MOROCCO

Nov. 18—King Mohamed V in his annual speech to Parliament declares that French and Spanish troops as well as U.S. military bases must be unconditionally evacuated. This is the first reply that has been made to the U.S. note of September asking to maintain its bases for another 7 years.

Nov. 22—Vice-President Abderahim Bouabid resigns.

Nov. 30—The Cabinet crisis resulting from the Vice-President's resignation continues. The leader of the Istiqlal Party's left-wing group declares that his followers are ready to form a leftist government.

POLAND

Nov. 11—Polish leaders end an 18-day good will visit to the Soviet Union.

A statement by Polish and Soviet leaders meeting in Moscow is issued simultaneously in both countries: Strengthening of the Warsaw Pact, a nuclear test ban, a summit conference, and the Rapacki Plan are endorsed. Moscow promises to assist Polish oil development and copper mining.

RUMANIA

Nov. 19—Rumania agrees to loan India some \$11 million in credit for the construction of an oil refinery.

SPAIN

Nov. 5—The U.S. loans Spain some \$138 million for economic development.

THE SUDAN

Nov. 17—Lieutenant General Ibrahim Abboud deposes Premier Abdullah Khalil in a quiet coup and puts himself and the army in control. He suspends the constitution, dismisses Parliament, declares a state of emergency, and closes newspapers and printing establishments.

Nov. 19—General Abboud is sworn in as Premier, Defense Minister and President of the Armed Forces Supreme Council.

Nov. 18—General Abboud names a Supreme Council composed of Army officers and a Cabinet including 5 civilians.

Nov. 22—Abboud promises that as soon as the country's ills have been corrected, he will hand control back to civilian authorities.

Nov. 27—Premier Ibrahim Abboud reveals that he and his colleagues approve the U.S. \$31 million aid program for Sudan "in general."

TUNISIA

Nov. 12—In reply to a Tunisian protest, the U.S. declares that its arm shipments to Tunisia are not subject to France's consent.

Nov. 13—President Habib Bourguiba announces that he is negotiating with Communist Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia to purchase light arms. He complains that Britain and the U.S. sell arms to Tunisia only with French approval.

Nov. 23—President Bourguiba discloses that several U.A.R. officers have been arrested for conspiring against his government.

U.S.S.R., THE (See also *Poland and International, Berlin Crisis.*)

Nov. 1—Nobel Prize-winner Boris Pasternak in a letter published today, asks Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev to allow him to remain in his country.

Nov. 2—The Government announces that 35 state farms have been ordered to convert to potato and vegetable farming to show the collective farms that productivity can be upped and prices can be cut.

Nov. 6—Boris Pasternak apologizes in the Communist paper *Pravda* for being willing to accept the Nobel Peace Prize, which he now declares to be a "political" award.

Nov. 7—The Soviet Union marks the forty-first anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution with a parade in Red Square.

Nov. 14—The Soviet Seven Year Plan is announced: an 80 per cent increase in productivity is expected (an 85-88 per cent increase in heavy industry and a 62-65 per cent increase in consumer goods). By the end of the plan (1959-1965) the Communist bloc would produce more than half of the world's industrial goods. By 1970 the Soviet Union expects to have the highest per capita rate of production in the world.

Khrushchev reveals for the first time that Marshal Nikolai A. Bulganin, former Premier, was ousted in June, 1957, because of "anti-party group" sympathies.

Nov. 25—Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi N. Zaroubin dies in a Moscow hospital.

Nov. 28—Industry sources report that the American Dow Chemical Company has signed an agreement with Russia for the purchase of \$13,500,000 worth of benzene.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (See also *Jordan.*)

Nov. 1—Air, road and telephone links between Jordan and the U.A.R. are re-instated following a 3-month halt.

Nov. 18—President Gamal Abdel Nasser reduces the powers of his only remaining Syrian Vice-President, Akram Hourani. His powers in Syria are delegated to another. He retains his post as U.A.R. Vice-President and Minister of Justice.

UNITED STATES**Agriculture**

Nov. 25—Corn farmers approve the new corn plan sponsored by Agriculture Secretary Ezra Taft Benson; the new plan ends corn planting controls and lowers price supports.

Foreign Policy (See also *International, Berlin Crisis.*)

- Nov. 6—The U.S. Court of Appeals rules in New York that refugees from the 1956 revolution in Hungary are entitled to constitutional protection although they came here without visas.
- Nov. 8—The European Atomic Energy Community and the U.S. sign an agreement under which the U.S. pledges a \$135 million loan and a 20-year supply of enriched uranium.
- Nov. 10—Opening the annual Colombo Plan Conference meeting in Seattle, President Eisenhower outlines a program for a "great peaceful crusade" against hunger and disease.
- Nov. 14—The President approves a list of strategic minerals that the Department of Agriculture may import through barter transactions; this is an expanded list. The minerals are traded for farm surplus goods.
- Nov. 16—The Department of Commerce reveals that the U.S. spent almost \$5 billion for foreign aid and related grant and loan programs in fiscal 1958.
- Nov. 17—The U.S. complains to the U.S.S.R. about a Russian attack on two U.S. planes over international waters on November 7.
- Nov. 18—C. Douglas Dillon, Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, suggests that the regional development loan institution planned by the Organization of American States should include a technical service staff. The U.S. also offers to negotiate treaties so that private U.S. investors no longer need pay to the U.S. the equivalent of tax concessions granted by the other American states.
- Nov. 21—In a note to the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the U.S. tells Hungary it must show that it will live up to its international obligations before there is any improvement in Hungarian-U.S. relations.
- Nov. 26—Vice President Richard Nixon takes part in services in London to dedicate the American Memorial Chapel in St. Paul's Cathedral.

Government

- Nov. 3—The new Federal Aviation Agency begins work.
- Nov. 6—Secretary of Commerce Sinclair

Weeks reveals a 250-item cut in the list of goods that cannot be exported to Communist states. Some 700 items are still under control.

- Nov. 8—President Eisenhower names George Cabot Lodge as Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs, replacing J. Ernest Wilkins.
- Nov. 10—Sinclair Weeks retires as Secretary of Commerce. He has been replaced by Lewis L. Strauss.
- Nov. 14—The U.S. Court of Appeals rules that the New York Power Authority has no legal right to take part of the Tuscarora Indian reservation for a power project unless the Federal Power Commission finds that the action will not "interfere" with the reservation.
- Nov. 17—Testifying under oath, George C. McConaughy denies that he ever took or asked for a bribe while Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission. Witnesses before the House Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight have reported links between McConaughy and applicants for a Pittsburgh television channel.
- Nov. 20—Federal Judge Edward Weinfeld forbids a proposed merger between the Bethlehem Steel Corporation and Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company because the merger would probably violate the Clayton Anti-trust Act and tend toward monopoly. The decision may be appealed.
- Nov. 22—In a memorandum made public today, the President asks all department and agency heads to comply with cuts in their budgets for fiscal 1960.

Labor

- Nov. 14—The United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners authorizes its executive board to withdraw from the C.I.O.-A.F.L. if it wants to do so.
- Nov. 16—The United Auto Workers sign a company-wide contract with the Chrysler Corporation, ending a five-day strike.
- Nov. 21—Seven thousand Trans World Airlines mechanics strike, grounding all T.W.A. planes.
- Nov. 24—Trans World Airlines, Eastern Airlines, and West Coast Airlines are strike-bound and half the nation's airliners may be grounded.

Nov. 25—American Airlines pilots obey a federal court no-strike injunction; National Airlines signs a wage agreement.

Nov. 26—On the third day of a strike, the United Auto Workers and Studebaker-Packard start negotiations again.

Nov. 29—A Federal judge says he has no authority to enjoin 2 million members of the National Maritime Union and the Seafarers International Union, who plan to boycott about one-sixth of the world's merchant fleet because their "runaway" ships fly "flags of convenience." The ships are registered under the flags of Panama, Liberia, Honduras and Costa Rica because of tax benefits.

Military

Nov. 8—A third Air Force Pioneer moon rocket climbs only 1 thousand miles and burns when the third stage fails to fire.

Nov. 19—The Department of Defense begins to cut armed forces by 70,000. The total by June 30, 1959, is expected to be no more than 2,525,000.

Nov. 20—The Air Force discontinues volunteer aircraft warning stations because of the efficiency of radar defense stations.

Nov. 29—The Defense Department confirms the fact that the Air Force successfully fired an intercontinental ballistic missile 6,325 miles to a point 30 miles from its target. The missile was launched from Cape Canaveral, Florida, into the South Atlantic on November 28.

Politics

Nov. 5—Returns from yesterday's elections show that the Democrats have won 13 seats in the Senate and 45 seats in the House. The Democrats have won the gubernatorial elections in 23 of the 32 states where the governorship was open. The Nebraska gubernatorial election is in doubt.

Nelson Rockefeller is elected governor of New York, winning against Democratic incumbent Averell Harriman.

Democratic Attorney General Pat Brown of California defeats Senator William Knowland for the governorship of California.

Nov. 26—In Alaska's first state elections, Democrat William A. Egan is named gov-

ernor; Democrats Ernest Gruening and E. L. Bartlett are elected to the Senate; Democrat Ralph J. Rivers will take Alaska's only seat in the House of Representatives.

Segregation

Nov. 10—The U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals tells the Little Rock Board of Education it must take "affirmative steps" to integrate the public schools in Little Rock.

Nov. 19—Virginia officials say that school closings are "temporary."

Nov. 20—Governor J. L. Almond of Virginia orders the U.S. flag taken down from the state capitol at Richmond; the flag of Virginia is to replace it. The Governor is not willing to fly the U.S. flag on top of the Virginia flag.

Nov. 28—A three-judge Federal court rules that Louisiana's law requiring racial segregation in athletics is unconstitutional.

Supreme Court

Nov. 10—The Supreme Court rules that certain construction workers employed away from their established residences cannot deduct board and room bills on their income tax returns, because such employment is not "temporary."

Nov. 18—The Supreme Court hears arguments on the jurisdiction and authority of the House Committee on Un-American Activities to investigate communism in education, and of a Virginia legislative committee to check into "racial activities."

Nov. 24—The Supreme Court affirms a lower court decision that the school placement law of Alabama is not automatically unconstitutional, and could be applied without racial discrimination.

Chief Justice John E. Eggleston of Virginia says that if the Virginia Supreme Court declares the state law requiring free public schools is unconstitutional, no federal court can contest the decision.

URUGUAY

Nov. 30—Voters go to the polls to elect an executive and congress. The Opposition National party is ahead according to incomplete returns. The incumbent Colorado party, in power for more than 90 years, loses in strength.

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